Analyzing the Impact of Adjustment Policies on the Poor: An IMMPA Framework for Brazil

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Abstract

This paper presents a modified version of the integrated macroeconomic model for poverty analysis (IMMPA) for Brazil. In addition to keeping some of the characteristics of the basic framework (such as labor market segmentation, disaggregated public expenditure, and credit market imperfections), it introduces bond financing of the budget deficit, unskilled urban unemployment, and a flexible exchange rate. The properties of the model are illustrated by assessing the impact of a rise in official interest rates on output, wages, unemployment, and poverty.

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1 Introduction

Brazil has achieved much progress in taming inflation since the Real Plan was implemented in July 1994. Despite the currency crisis of January 1999 (which led to the abandonment of the bands regime and the adoption of a flexible exchange rate, and the subsequent introduction of an inflation targeting framework), and the turmoil on world capital markets that followed the Argentina crisis of 2001-02, inflation has remained below double digit levels for the past few years, in large part due to active management of short-term interest rates by the Brazilian central bank. The era of low inflation has been accompanied by improved financial intermediation (as measured by an increase in the share of credit to GDP), significant progress in reducing fiscal deficits and the burden of domestic public debt. On average, the annual growth rate of the economy remained at about 2 percent per annum between 1994 and 2001, despite the recession of 1999 (Da Fonseca (2001)). However, progress in reducing poverty and income inequality has been mixed. Despite a slight reduction in the immediate aftermath of the Real Plan, the Gini coefficient has remained at around 0.6 during the 1990s. Brazil’s income inequality indicators remain indeed one of the worst in the world. Significant gains were achieved in reducing poverty after the Real Plan, with the share of the poor in the population falling by 10 percentage points between 1992 and 1995, as a result of the pickup in growth and increase in per capita income that followed. Nevertheless, little progress has been achieved since then; a significant percentage of the population remains in deep poverty, with the headcount poverty index reaching - percent in 1999. Reducing the proportion of the poor remains one of the key policy issues in Brazil.

The purpose of this paper is to develop a quantitative framework for analyzing the impact of adjustment (both structural and macroeconomic) policies on wages, unemployment, poverty and income distribution in Brazil.\footnote{For a review of CGE models for the Brazilian economy since the mid-1990s, see Domingues (2002). For earlier models, see Guilhoto (1995).} Our point of departure is the IMMPA prototype developed by Agénor, Izquierdo, and Fofack (2003) for low-income countries. Without a doubt, the IMMPA prototype captures several important features of the Brazilian economy, which are common to many developing countries: the pervasive role of the informal economy and the relative scarcity of “good jobs” for unskilled workers in the urban sector, labor market segmentation, the links between the financial
sector and the supply side through the credit market. In addition, however, there are several important characteristics of the Brazilian economy that are not well captured in the low-income IMMPA prototype, which therefore needs to be amended or modified to make it useful for policy discussions.

Accordingly, in this paper we extend the low-income IMMPA framework in several directions. First, we allow for open unskilled urban unemployment, by introducing a Harris-Todaro type mechanism to determine the supply of unskilled labor in the formal sector. This extension is very important for a country like Brazil, where unskilled workers account for a large fraction of employment (61.8 percent of total employment in 1996 and 58.5 percent in 1999) and unemployment: in 1999, the overall, open unemployment rate stood at 10.2, up from 7.4 percent in 1996. The skilled unemployment rate amounted to 4.8 percent, whereas the unemployment rate for unskilled labor represented 5.3 percent. Second, we specify a general and highly flexible form for the determination of skilled workers’ wage in the private formal sector. This specification incorporates the critical distinction between the product wage (which firms are concerned with) and the consumption wage (which matters for labor suppliers), a level effect of unemployment on wages, which is consistent with various forms of efficiency wage theories, such as those emphasizing the wage-productivity link or turnover costs. It is consistent with a negative effect of unemployment on workers’ reservation wage, and wage-setting models based on a bargaining framework between firms and trade unions. It also accounts for the effect of payroll taxation on firms’ wage bill and the cost of borrowing for financing workers’ compensation. Third, we account for the possibility of congestion effects associated with the use of public sector services in the urban sector. Fourth, we introduce the possibility of bond financing of public sector deficits and preclude at the same time borrowing from the central bank. Sustainability of Brazil’s public debt remains a key policy issue; during the 1995-2000 period, the net public debt (domestic and external) of the consolidated public sector increased indeed from 30.4 percent of GDP to 46 percent (Bevilaqua and Garcia (2002)). More generally, this modification is important for many middle-income countries, where (in addition to foreign borrowing) governments have increasingly issued domestic bonds to finance their fiscal deficits. Of course, we model not only the “supply” side of the bonds market but also the “demand” side, that is, holdings of bonds by households (capitalists and rentiers) and the financial system. Fifth, we assume that the exchange rate is fully flexible and equilibrates the balance of payments. Official reserves are therefore exogenous.
Finally, we model monetary policy by assuming that the central bank sets a policy interest rate (such as the repurchase rate) and has a perfectly elastic supply curve of liquidity to commercial banks. Continuous equilibrium of the credit market is thus obtained not by foreign borrowing by commercial banks (as in the prototype IMMPA framework), but by domestic borrowing.

We also make other (somewhat less significant) modifications to reflect Brazil’s institutional characteristics and the type of policy issues that we want to address. First, we assume that nominal wages are fully flexible in both the traded and nontraded agricultural sector and adjusts continuously to equilibrate the supply and demand for labor in the rural labor market. This simplifies the calculation of the expected rural wage that affects migration decisions. Second, we exclude borrowing from the financial system in the traded agricultural sector, given its relatively limited empirical importance. This has an important effect, of course, on the transmission process of financial shocks to rural areas and rural production. Third, we keep public sector wages for skilled workers as exogenous (instead of assuming equality with private sector wages) and assume that there is a non-pecuniary benefit (in terms of, say, increased job security) that leads to zero turnover for that category of workers. Finally, we also introduce payroll taxation on both categories of labor in the private, urban formal sector, in order to analyze the impact of changes in the taxation of firms’ wage bill on employment and poverty. The extent to which high payroll taxes have tended to discourage the demand for labor (particularly unskilled labor) has been an important policy issue in Brazil in the past few years; our framework allows us to consider the general implications of changes in these taxes—which operate partly through its “pure” fiscal effects.

The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section II describes the “macro” component of the model, whereas Section III explains the data and indicators used for poverty and income distribution analysis. Section IV discusses briefly the calibration and solution procedures, including the structure of the financial SAM that underlies the model. Section V considers as a policy experiment an increase in official interest rates and discusses the response of production, wages, employment, and poverty. Section VI performs some sensitivity analysis. The last section summarizes the main results and considers some future extensions of our analysis.
2 An IMMPA Framework for Brazil

In this section we review these various building blocks of the model. We consider in turn the production side, employment, the demand side, external trade, sectoral and aggregate prices, income formation, the financial sector and asset allocation decisions, and the public sector. Throughout the discussion, we often use “generic” forms to specify functional relationships; explicit functional forms (as well as variable names and definitions) are provided in Appendices A and B.

2.1 Production

The basic distinction on the production side is that between rural and urban sectors. Unlike the IMMPA prototype of Agénor, Izquierdo and Fofack (2003), the rural sector produces only one good, which is sold both on domestic markets and abroad. Urban production includes both formal and informal components; in addition, the formal urban economy is separated between production of a private good (sold on both domestic markets and abroad) and a public good.

2.1.1 Rural Production

Land available for production in agriculture is assumed to be in fixed supply and there is no market to trade property claims on it. Gross output of the agricultural good, $X_A$, is given by the sum of value added, $V_A$, and intermediate consumption:

$$X_A = V_A + X_A \sum_i a_{iA}, \quad \text{for } i = A, I, P, G$$

where the $a_{ij}$ are conventionally-defined input-output coefficients (sales from sector $i$ to sector $j$) and $A, I, P, G$ are used in what follows to refer, respectively, to the agricultural sector, the informal sector, the private urban sector, and the public sector.

Value added is assumed to be produced with a Cobb-Douglas (CD) function of land, $LAND$, and a composite factor, defined as a constant elasticity of substitution (CES) function that depends on the number of unskilled rural workers employed in agriculture, $U_A$, and the economy-wide stock of public
physical capital \((K_G, \text{which is defined below})\):

\[ V_A = CD[LAND, CES(U_A, K_G)], \] (2)

For simplicity, in what follows we normalize the area of land allocated to production to unity. Given the CD specification, agricultural production exhibits decreasing returns to scale in the remaining (composite) input.

The presence of \(K_G\) in the production functions (2) and (??) is based on the view that a greater availability of public physical capital in the economy (roads, power plants, and the like) improves the productivity of private firms and other production units in agriculture, because it facilitates not only trade and domestic commerce but also the production process itself. Thus, our concept of public capital includes not only roads and public transportation that may increase access to markets, but also power plants and similar public goods that may contribute to an increase in productivity.

Allocation of agricultural output to domestic consumption, \(D_A\), and exports, \(E_A\), occurs according to a production possibility frontier, defined by a constant elasticity of transformation (CET) function:

\[ X_A = CET(D_A, E_A). \] (3)

As discussed below, the ratio \(E_A/D_A\) depends (in standard fashion) on relative prices.

2.1.2 Urban Informal Production

Gross production in the urban informal sector, \(X_I\), is given as the sum of value added, \(V_I\), and intermediate consumption:

\[ X_I = V_I + X_I \sum a_{iI}, \quad \text{for } i = A, I, P, G \] (4)

There is no physical capital in the informal sector, and production requires only unskilled labor. Assuming decreasing returns to scale, value added can thus be written solely as a function of the number of unskilled workers employed in the informal economy, \(U_I\):

\[ V_I = \alpha_{XI} U_I^{\beta_{XI}}, \quad \alpha_{XI} > 0, \ 0 < \beta_{XI} < 1. \] (5)

From (5), the demand for labor in the informal sector is given by
\[ U_I^d = \beta X_I(V_I/w_I), \]  
where \( w_I \) is the product wage given by \( w_I = W_I/PV_I \), with \( PV_I \) denoting the price of value added in the informal sector (defined below).

### 2.1.3 Production of public goods and services

Gross production of public goods and services (or public good, for short), \( X_G \), is given by the sum of value added, \( V_G \), and intermediate consumption:

\[ X_G = V_G + X_G \sum_i a_{iG}, \quad \text{for } i = A, I, P, G \]  

Production of value added requires both types of labor (skilled and unskilled) and is given by a two-level CES function. At the lower level unskilled workers, \( U_G \), and skilled workers, \( S_G \), combine to produce “effective” employment in the public sector; and at the second level, effective labor and public capital, \( K_G \) combine to produce net output:

\[ V_G = CES[CES(S_G, U_G), K_G]. \]

Employment levels of both categories of workers are treated as exogenous.

### 2.1.4 Urban Formal Private Production

Private formal production uses as inputs both skilled and unskilled labor, as well as physical capital. Skilled labor and private physical capital have a higher degree of complementarity (lower degree of substitution) than physical capital and unskilled workers. In order to account explicitly for these differences in the degree of substitutability among inputs, we adopt a nested CES production structure. Specifically gross production of the private formal-urban sector, \( X_P \), is taken to be given by the sum of value added, \( V_P \), and intermediate consumption:

\[ X_P = V_P + X_P \sum_i a_{iP}, \quad \text{for } i = A, I, P, G, \]  

where

\[ V_P = CES\{CES[S_P, K_P], U_P], \frac{K_{G,-1}}{L_{U,-1}} \} \]
where $pc \geq 0$.

At the lowest level of equation (10), skilled labor, $S_P$, and private capital, $K_P$, are combined to form the composite input $T_2$, with a low elasticity of substitution between them. At the second level, this composite input is used together with unskilled labor, $U_P$, to form the composite input $T_1$. The elasticity of substitution between $T_2$ and unskilled workers, $U_P$, is higher than between $S_P$ and $K_P$. The final layer involves combining $T_1$ and the lagged value of the ratio of $K_G$ (the stock of government capital) to the total size of the labor force (or equivalently, the total population) in the urban sector, $L_U$ (defined below). The presence of this ratio can be rationalized as follows. As noted earlier, a greater stock of public capital (roads, power plants, and the like) raises the productivity of private production. However, due to congestion effects, this positive externality of public capital decreases as its usage increases.\(^2\) The total level of employment in the urban sector is used as a proxy for usage. When $pc = 0$, public capital is a pure public good. Otherwise, the higher the size of the labor force in urban areas, the lower is the contribution of the public capital stock to private production.

Private firms in the urban formal sector allocate their output to exports, $E_P$, or the domestic market, $D_P$, according to a production possibility frontier, which is also defined by a CET function:

$$X_P = CET(E_P, D_P). \quad (11)$$

As shown later, the ratio $E_P/D_P$ depends also on relative prices.

### 2.2 Wages, Employment, Migration and Skills Acquisition

Unskilled workers in the economy may be employed either in the rural economy, $U_R$, or in the urban economy, $U_U$, whereas skilled workers are employed only in the urban economy. We also assume that skilled workers are not employed in the informal economy either—perhaps as a result of signaling considerations, as discussed later.

\(^2\)See Agénor (2002b, Chapter 5) for a detailed discussion of the nature of congestion effects associated with public services.
2.2.1 Rural Wages and Employment

The demand for labor in the agricultural sector consistent with profit maximization, $U^d_A$, can be derived as

$$U^d_A = \left( V_A^{1+\frac{\rho A X A}{\eta A X A}} \cdot \frac{1 - \eta A X A}{w_A} \right)^{\frac{1}{1+\rho A X A}},$$

where $w_A = \frac{W_A}{PV_A}$, \(12\)

where $W_A$ denotes the nominal wage and $PV_A$ the net output price in the agricultural sector (both determined below).

Nominal wages in agriculture adjust to clear the labor market. Let $U^s_R$ denote labor supply in agriculture; the equilibrium condition is thus given by

$$U^s_R = U^d_A(V_A, \frac{W_A}{PV_A}).$$

The size of the labor force in the rural sector, $U^s_R$, is predetermined at any given point in time. Over time, $U^s_R$ grows at the exogenous population growth rate, $g_R$, net of worker migration to urban areas, $MIGR$:

$$U^s_R = U^s_{R-1}(1 + g_R) - MIGR.$$ \(14\)

Following Harris and Todaro (1970), the incentives to migrate are taken to depend negatively on the ratio of the average expected consumption wage in rural areas to that prevailing in urban areas. Unskilled workers in the urban economy may be employed either in the private formal sector, in which case they are paid a minimum wage, $W_M$, or they can enter the informal economy and receive the market-determined wage in that sector, $W_I$.\(^3\) When rural workers make the decision to migrate to urban areas, they are uncertain as to which type of job they will be able to get, and therefore weigh wages in each sector by the probability of finding a job in that sector. Assuming, for simplicity, complete job turnover in the urban sector, these probabilities can be approximated by prevailing employment ratios. Finally, potential migrants also consider what their expected purchasing power in rural and urban areas will be, depending on whether they stay in the rural sector and consume the “typical” basket of goods of rural households, or migrate and consume the “typical” urban basket of goods.

\(^3\)As discussed below, there is no job turnover for either category of workers in the public sector.
The expected, unskilled urban real wage, $Ew_U$, is thus a weighted average of the minimum wage in the formal sector and the going wage in the informal sector, deflated by an urban consumption price index for unskilled workers, $P_{UU}$ (defined below):

$$Ew_U = \frac{\theta_U W_{M,-1} + (1 - \theta_U)W_{I,-1}}{P_{UU,-1}},$$  \hspace{1cm} (15)

where $\theta_U$ is the probability of finding a job in the urban formal sector, measured by the proportion of unskilled workers in the private formal sector, relative to the total number of unskilled urban workers (net of government employment) looking for a job, in the previous period:

$$\theta_U = \frac{U_{P,-1}}{U_{F,-1} - U_{G,-1}}.$$  \hspace{1cm} (16)

In the rural sector, the employment probability is equal to unity, because workers can always find a job at the going wage. Assuming a one-period lag, the expected rural consumption real wage, $Ew_A$, is thus given by

$$Ew_A = \frac{W_{A,-1}}{P_{R,-1}}.$$  \hspace{1cm} (17)

where $P_R$ is the composite, rural consumption price index (defined below).

The migration function can therefore be specified as

$$MIGR = U_{R,-1}\lambda m \left[ \sigma_M \ln \left( \frac{Ew_U}{Ew_A} \right) \right] + (1 - \lambda_m)\frac{U_{R,-1}}{U_{R,-2}} MIGR_{-1},$$

where $0 < \lambda_m < 1$ measures the speed of adjustment and $\sigma_M > 0$ measures the elasticity of migration flows with respect to expected wages. This specification assumes that costs associated with migration or other frictions may delay the migration process, introducing persistence in migration flows.

### 2.2.2 Urban Unskilled Wages, Employment, and Unemployment

Both the government and private firms in the formal and informal urban sectors use unskilled labor in production. The public sector is assumed to hire an exogenous level of unskilled workers, $U_G$, at the nominal wage rate $W_{UG}$, whereas the demand for unskilled labor by the formal private sector
is determined by firms’ profit maximization subject to the given minimum wage, $W_M$.\(^4\) Formal private sector firms cannot issue equity claims on their capital and do not issue debt securities; instead, they borrow to finance their wage bill (inclusive of payroll taxes) prior to the sale of output. As a result, the effective price of labor includes the bank lending rate. We assume also that firms pay a payroll tax, at the rate $0 < ptaxU < 1$ for unskilled workers, which is proportional to the wage bill, $W_MU_P$. Unskilled labor demand by the private sector is thus given by

$$U_P^d = T_1 \left( \frac{1}{(1 + IL_1)(1 + ptaxU)w_M \alpha_{XP1}^{XP1}} \right)^{\sigma_{XP1}} , \text{ where } w_M = \frac{W_M}{PT_1}, \quad (18)$$

where $IL$ is the lending rate.\(^5\)

In order to avoid corner solutions, we assume that the wage rate paid to unskilled labor in the formal urban sector is systematically greater than the real wage rate paid in the informal sector. Consequently, unskilled urban workers will first seek employment in the private formal sector. The actual level of employment in that sector is determined according to equation (18).

We also assume that, as a result of relocation and congestion costs, mobility of the unskilled labor force between the formal and the informal sectors is imperfect. Migration flows are determined by expected income opportunities, along the lines of Harris and Todaro (1970).\(^6\) Specifically, the supply of unskilled workers in the formal sector (including public sector workers), $U_F^s$, is assumed to change gradually over time as a function of the expected wage differential across sectors, measured in real terms. Wage and employment prospects are formed on the basis of prevailing conditions in the labor market. Because there is no job turnover in the public sector, the expected nominal wage in the formal economy is equal to the minimum wage weighted by the probability of being hired in the private sector. Assuming that hiring in that sector is random, this probability can be approximated by the ratio of currently employed workers to those seeking employment at the previous period.

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\(^4\)As discussed below, unskilled workers earn actually a wage that is a multiple of the official minimum wage. Moreover, the wedge has remained stable over time. Consequently, we simply assume that workers earn the legally-set minimum wage.

\(^5\)We assume that the cost of credit specified in loan contracts negotiated for the current period is based on the interest rate prevailing at the previous period.

\(^6\)Note that in the present setup the Harris- Todaro framework is used to explain migration flows between the (urban) informal sector and the (urban) formal sector, rather than migration between the rural and the urban sectors.
period, \( U_{F,-1}^d / (U_{F,-1}^s - U_{G,-1}^s) \). The expected nominal wage in the informal economy, \( W_I \), is simply the going wage, because there are no barriers to entry in that sector. Assuming a one-period lag, the supply of unskilled workers in the formal sector thus evolves over time according to

\[
\Delta U_F^s = \beta_F \left\{ \frac{U_{P,-1}^d}{U_{F,-1}^s - U_{G,-1}} \left( \frac{W_{M1,-1}}{P_{UU,-1}} - \frac{W_{I,-1}}{P_{UU,-1}} \right) \right\}, \quad \beta_F > 0, \tag{19}
\]

where \( \beta_F \) denotes the speed of adjustment.\(^7\) The rate of unskilled unemployment in the formal sector, \( UNEMP_U \), is thus given by

\[
UNEMP_U = 1 - \left( \frac{U_G + U_{P,-1}^d}{U_F^s} \right). \tag{20}
\]

The supply of labor in the informal economy, \( U_I^s \), is obtained by subtracting from the urban unskilled labor force, \( U_U \), the quantity \( U_F^s \):

\[
U_I^s = U_U - U_F^s. \tag{21}
\]

The informal labor market clears continuously, so that \( U_I^d = U_I^s \). From equations (6) and (21), the equilibrium nominal wage is thus given by

\[
W_I = \beta_X I \left( \frac{PV_I \cdot V_I}{U_I^s} \right). \tag{22}
\]

The urban unskilled labor supply, \( U_U \), grows as a result of “natural” urban population growth and migration of unskilled labor from the rural economy, as discussed earlier. Moreover, some urban unskilled workers, \( SKL \), acquire skills and leave the unskilled labor force to increase the supply of skilled labor in the economy. We make the additional assumption that individuals are born unskilled, and therefore natural urban population growth (not resulting from migration or skills acquisition factors) is represented by urban unskilled population growth only, at the exogenous rate \( g_U \). Thus, the size of the urban unskilled labor supply evolves according to

\[
U_U = U_{U,-1} (1 + g_U) + MIGR - SKL. \tag{23}
\]

\(^7\) As noted by Agenor (199-), the absence of on-the-job search in the informal sector in the present setup can be justified in a variety of ways. An important consideration is the existence of informational inefficiencies, which may result from the absence of institutions capable of processing and providing in a timely manner relevant information on job opportunities to potential applicants. As a result, search activities for unskilled workers in the formal sector may require, literally speaking, waiting for job offers at factory gates.
2.2.3 Urban Skilled Wages and Employment

As noted earlier, the employment levels of both skilled and unskilled workers in the public (urban) sector are taken as exogenous. We also take as given the real wage rate that skilled workers are paid in the public sector, $\omega_{SG}$. With $W_{SG}$ denoting the nominal wage, and $P_{US}$ the consumption price index for (urban) skilled workers, full indexation therefore implies that

$$W_{SG} = \omega_{SG}P_{US}. \quad (24)$$

We assume again that private urban firms pay a payroll tax, at the rate $0 < \text{ptax}_S < 1$, for skilled workers, that is proportional to the wage bill, $W_S S_P$. The wage-setting equation for skilled labor in the private sector is given by

$$W_S = \bar{w}_S (PIND_S)^{\text{ind}_S} (UNEMP_S)^{-\phi_U} \Omega_W^{\phi_1} \left( \frac{P_{US}}{PT_2} \right)^{\phi_2}. \quad (25)$$

where $PIND_S = \text{PLEV}$ or $PT_2$ (depending on whether the nominal wage is indexed to the overall level of prices or the composite “product” price), $\Omega_W > 0$ is the reservation rate, $UNEMP_S$ the unemployment rate of skilled labor (defined below), and $\phi_U, \phi_1, \phi_2 > 0$.

This specification is quite flexible. For instance, full indexation on the consumer price index only requires setting $PIND_S = \text{PLEV}$, $\text{ind}_S = 1$, and $\phi_U = \phi_1 = \phi_2 = \phi_3 = 0$. This case is important because it implies that whereas firms are concerned with the product wage, workers are concerned with the consumption wage. This creates a wedge through which relative prices affect wage-setting decisions. To assume that the product wage depends only on the ratio $P_{US}/PT_2$ requires setting $PIND_S = PT_2$, $\text{ind}_S = 1$, $\phi_2 > 0$, and $\phi_U = \phi_1 = 0$. Note also that in (25), as long as $\phi_U > 0$, the level of skilled unemployment will affect (negatively) the level of nominal wages, instead of the rate of growth of wages (as would be the case with a Phillips curve-type formulation). This level effect is consistent with various forms of efficiency wage theories (such as those emphasizing the wage-productivity link or turnover costs), in which unemployment acts as a “worker discipline

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8To avoid a corner solution in which no worker would want to seek employment in the public sector, we assume that working for the government provides a nonpecuniary benefit (perhaps in terms of higher job security or reduced volatility of future earnings) that is sufficiently large to ensure that the differential between $W_{SG}$ and $W_S$ is not “excessive” (in the sense that $S_G$ remains positive at all times).
device”, by moderating wage demands, eliciting a higher level of effort, and by reducing the incentive to quit and thus lowering turnover costs (see Agénor (1996)).

From (10), the demand for skilled labor is given by

$$S_{P}^{d} = T_{2}^{K_{S}} \left( \frac{1}{(1 + IL_{-1}) (1 + ptax_{S}) w_{S}} \cdot \frac{\beta_{XP2}}{\alpha_{XP2}} \right)^{\alpha_{P2}}, \text{ where } w_{S} = \frac{W_{S}}{PT_{2}}. \quad (26)$$

Given that firms set wages and are on their labor demand curve, open skilled unemployment may emerge. The rate of skilled unemployment, $UNEMP_{S}$, is given by the ratio of skilled workers who are not employed either by the private or the public sector, divided by the total population of skilled workers:

$$UNEMP_{S} = 1 - \frac{(S_{G} + S_{P}^{d})}{S}. \quad (27)$$

We assume that skilled workers who are unable to find a job in the formal economy opt to remain openly unemployed, instead of entering the informal economy (in contrast to unskilled workers), perhaps because of adverse signaling effects.

The evolution of the skilled labor force depends on the rate at which unskilled workers choose to acquire skills:

$$S = (1 - \delta_{S})S_{-1} + SKL, \quad (28)$$

where $0 < \delta_{S} < 1$ is the rate of “depreciation” or “de-skilling” of the skilled labor force.

Finally, the total size of the labor force in the urban sector, $L_{U}$, is given by

$$L_{U} = U_{U} + S. \quad (29)$$

2.2.4 Acquisition of Skills

The acquisition of skills by unskilled workers is assumed to depend on two factors: a) relative expected consumption wages of skilled and unskilled urban workers (as a proxy for the future stream of earnings associated with higher

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9 A bargaining framework between firms and a centralized trade union could also lead to a similar wage-setting specification. See Agénor (2003) and Agénor, El Aynaoui, and Abdelkhalak (2003).
levels of education); and b) the government stock of education capital, $K_E$, which limits the ability to invest in skills.

Consider first the effect of wages. In case they acquire skills, current unskilled workers expect to earn wage $W_S$ if they are employed (with probability $\theta_S$) and nothing if they are unemployed. The purchasing power of this wage is obtained by deflating it by a consumption price index for skilled workers, $P_{US,-1}$ (defined below):

$$Ew_S = \theta_S \frac{W_{S,-1}}{P_{US,-1}}$$

where $\theta_S$ is measured by the ratio in the previous period of the number of skilled workers employed in the private sector, over the total number of skilled workers that are not employed in the public sector:

$$\theta_S = \frac{S_{P,-1}}{S_{-1} - S_{G,-1}}$$  \hspace{1cm} (30)

If they remain unskilled, workers expect to get the average unskilled wage, which is a weighted average of the minimum wage $W_M$ and the informal wage rate. Assuming, again, that there is no job turnover in the public sector, the average expected real wage is given by (A9), which is repeated here for convenience:

$$Ew_U = \frac{\theta_U W_{M,-1} + (1 - \theta_U)W_{I,-1}}{P_{UU,-1}}$$

with $\theta_U$ as defined above. Given these effects, the flow increase in the supply of skilled labor can be written as:

$$SKL = \lambda_S \left[ \kappa_e \left( \frac{Ew_S}{Ew_U} \right)^{\sigma_w} (K_{E,-1})^{\sigma_e} \right] + (1 - \lambda_S)SKL_{-1}$$  \hspace{1cm} (31)

where $0 < \lambda_S < 1$, and $\kappa_e$ is a shift parameter.\(^{10}\)

Public investment in education, $I_E$ (which is treated as exogenous), determines the rate at which the stock of public capital in education grows over time:

$$K_E = K_{E,-1}(1 - \delta_E) + \frac{I_{E,-1}}{PQ_{P,-1}}$$  \hspace{1cm} (32)

\(^{10}\)Note that we abstract from the cost of acquiring skills (as measured by the number of years of schooling multiplied by the average cost of education per year), which should also affect the propensity to invest in skills acquisition.
where $0 < \delta_E < 1$ is a depreciation rate. We assume that only the private good is used to invest in education and therefore deflate nominal investment by the demand price $PQ_P$ (defined below).

### 2.3 Supply and Demand

Both the informal and public sector goods are nontraded. Total supply in each sector is thus equal to gross production, that is

$$ X_I = Q^*_I, \quad X_G = Q^*_G. \quad (33) $$

Agricultural and private formal urban goods, by contrast, compete with imported goods. The supply of the composite good for each of these sectors consists of a CES combination of imports and domestically produced goods:

$$ Q^*_A = CES(M_A, D_A), \quad (34) $$
$$ Q^*_P = CES(M_P, D_P). \quad (35) $$

For the agricultural and informal sectors, aggregate demand ($Q^d_A$ and $Q^d_I$) consists of intermediate consumption and demand for final consumption (by both the government and the private sector), whereas aggregate demand for the public and private goods ($Q^d_G$ and $Q^d_P$) consists not only of intermediate consumption and final consumption but also of investment demand:

$$ Q^d_A = C_A + G_A + INT_A, \quad (36) $$
$$ Q^d_I = C_I + INT_I, \quad (37) $$
$$ Q^d_G = C_G + G_G + Z_G + INT_G, \quad (38) $$
$$ Q^d_P = C_P + G_P + Z_P + INT_P, \quad (39) $$

where $INT_j$ (with $j = A, I, G, P$) is defined as total demand (by all productions sectors) for intermediate consumption of good $j$:

$$ INT_j = \sum_i a_{ji} X_i, \quad \text{for } j = A, I, P, G. \quad (40) $$

Government expenditure on good $j$, $G_j$, is expressed in real terms as:

$$ G_j = gg_j \frac{G}{PQ_j}, \quad \text{for } j = A, P, G, \quad (41) $$
where \( G \) represents total nominal government expenditure, \( PQ_h \) is the market price of goods purchased by the government, and \( gg_A + gg_G + gg_P = 1 \). Note that the government is assumed not to spend on informal sector goods.

Final consumption for each production sector \( i \), \( C_i \), is the summation across all categories of households of nominal consumption of good \( i \), deflated by the demand price of good \( i \):

\[
C_i = \sum_h C_{ih} = \sum_h x_{ih} + \frac{\sum_h cc_{ih}(CON_h - \sum_i PQ_i x_{ih})}{PQ_i},
\]

(42)

where \( C_{ih} \) is consumption of good \( i \) by household \( h \), \( x_{ih} \) is the subsistence (or autonomous) level of consumption of good \( i \) by household \( h \), \( CON_h \) total nominal consumption expenditure by household \( h \), and \( PQ_i \) the composite sales price of good \( i \) (defined below). Equations (42) are based on the linear expenditure system. Coefficients \( cc_{ih} \) indicate how total nominal consumption expenditure by household \( h \), \( CON_h \), is allocated to each type of good and satisfy the restrictions:

\[
0 < cc_{ih} < 1, \forall i, h, \sum_i cc_{ih} = 1.
\]

Finally, aggregate investment made by firms, \( Z \), consists of purchases of both public and private goods and services (\( Z_G \) and \( Z_P \) respectively):

\[
Z_i = zz_i PK \cdot \frac{Z}{PQ_i},
\]

where \( zz_G + zz_P = 1 \). Coefficients \( zz_i \) measure the allocation of total investment demand to public and private goods.

2.4 External Trade

As indicated earlier, firms in agriculture and the private formal sectors allocate their output to the domestic market or exports according to the production possibility frontier (PPF) specified in equations (??) and (11), and the relative price of exports (\( PE_A \) and \( PE_P \), respectively) vis-à-vis domestic goods (\( PD_A \) and \( PD_P \), respectively). Efficiency conditions require that firms equate this relative price to the opportunity cost in production. This yields:

\[
E_A = D_A \left( \frac{PE_A}{PD_A} \cdot \frac{1 - \beta_{TA}}{\beta_{TA}} \right)^{\sigma_{TA}},
\]

(43)
\[ E_P = D_P \left( \frac{P E_P}{P D_P} \cdot \frac{1 - \beta_{TP}}{\beta_{TP}} \right)^{\sigma_{TP}}. \]  

(44)

As noted earlier, imports compete with domestic goods in the agricultural sector as well as in the private formal sector. Making use of Armington functions for the demand for imported vs. domestic goods and relative prices, import demand for both sectors \((M_A \text{ and } M_P)\) can be written as:

\[ M_A = D_A \left( \frac{P D_A}{P M_A} \cdot \frac{\beta_{QA}}{1 - \beta_{QA}} \right)^{\sigma_{QA}}, \]  

(45)

\[ M_P = D_P \left( \frac{P D_P}{P M_P} \cdot \frac{\beta_{QP}}{1 - \beta_{QP}} \right)^{\sigma_{QP}}. \]  

(46)

These equations show that the ratio of imports to both categories of domestic goods depends on the relative prices of these goods and the elasticity of substitution, \(\sigma_{QA}\) and \(\sigma_{QP}\), between these goods.

2.5 Prices

The net or value added price of output is given by the gross price, \(P X_i\), net of indirect taxes, less the cost of intermediate inputs (purchased at composite prices):

\[ PV_i = V_i^{-1} \left\{ P X_i(1 - dtax_i) - \sum_j a_{ji} P Q_j \right\} X_i, \text{ where } i, j = A, I, P, G, \]  

(47)

where \(dtax_i\) is the rate of indirect taxation of output in sector \(i\) (with \(dtax_I = 0\) because there is no indirect taxation of informal sector output).

The world prices of imported and exported goods are taken to be exogenously given. The domestic currency price of these goods is obtained by adjusting the world price by the exchange rate, with import prices also adjusted by the tariff rate, \(tm\):

\[ P E_i = wpe_i ER, \text{ for } i = A, P, \]  

(48)

\[ P M_i = wpm_i(1 + tm_i) ER, \text{ for } i = A, P. \]  

(49)
Because the transformation function between exports and domestic sales of the agricultural and urban private good is linear homogeneous, the domestic sales prices, \( PX_A \) and \( PX_P \), are derived from the expenditure identity:

\[
PX_i X_i = PD_i D_i + PE_i E_i, \quad \text{for } i = A, P,
\]

that is,

\[
PX_i = \frac{PD_i D_i + PE_i E_i}{X_i}, \quad \text{for } i = A, P. \quad (50)
\]

For the informal and public sectors (both of which do not export and do not compete with imports), the composite price is equal to the domestic market price, \( PD_i \), which is in turn equal to the output price, \( PX_i \):

\[
PD_i = PX_i, \quad \text{for } i = I, G, \quad (51)
\]

with both prices determined to clear the market for these goods (see below).

For the agricultural sector and private urban production, the substitution function between imports and domestic goods is also linearly homogeneous, and the composite market price is determined accordingly by the expenditure identity:

\[
PQ_i Q_i = PD_i D_i + PM_i M_i, \quad \text{for } i = A, P,
\]

that is

\[
PQ_i = \frac{PD_i D_i + PM_i M_i}{Q_i}, \quad \text{for } i = A, P. \quad (52)
\]

The nested CES production function of private formal urban goods is also linearly homogeneous; prices of the composite inputs are therefore derived in similar fashion:

\[
T_1 PT_1 = T_2 PT_2 + (1 + IL_{-1})(1 + ptax_U)W_M U_P, \quad (53)
\]

\[
T_2 PT_2 = PROF_P + (1 + IL_{-1})(1 + ptax_S)W_S S_P, \quad (54)
\]

where \( PROF_P \), as defined below, denotes profits of private firms in the urban formal sector. These equations can be solved for \( PT_1 \) and \( PT_2 \).

The price of capital is constructed as using the investment expenditure identity, which involves those goods for which there is investment demand, namely, the public good and private-formal urban good (see equations (38) and (39)):

\[
PK = \frac{\sum_i PQ_i Z_i}{Z} = \frac{PQ_G Z_G + PQ_P Z_P}{Z}. \quad (55)
\]
Markets for informal goods and government services clear continuously; equilibrium conditions are thus given by

\[ Q^*_I = Q^d_I, \quad Q^*_G = Q^d_G. \]

In solving the model, we use equations (33) to determine the equilibrium quantities \( Q_I \) and \( Q_G \), that is, equations (4) and (7), respectively. We use the demand equations (37) and (38) to solve residually for \( C_I \) and \( C_G \), that is:

\[ X_I - INT_I = C_I, \quad (56) \]
\[ X_G - G_G - Z_G - INT_G = C_G. \quad (57) \]

Equation (42) for \( i = I, G \), is then solved for \( PQ_I = PD_I = PX_I \) and \( PQ_G = PD_G = PX_G \), respectively. Define discretionary consumption expenditure of household \( h \), \( COND_h \), as

\[ COND_h = CON_h - \sum_i PQ_ix_{ih}, \quad (58) \]

and define the share of autonomous consumption of good \( i \) in total consumption of good \( i \), \( ac_i \), as

\[ ac_i = \frac{\sum_h PQ_i x_{ih}}{PQ_i C_i} = \frac{\sum_h x_{ih}}{C_i}. \quad (59) \]

Then, from (42), we have

\[ PD_i = PX_i = (1 - ac_i)^{-1} \cdot \left\{ \frac{\sum_h CC_{ih} COND_h}{C_i} \right\}, \quad i = I, G. \quad (60) \]

The aggregate price level, \( PLEV \), or consumer price index, is a weighted average of individual goods market prices, \( PQ_i \):

\[ PLEV = \sum_i wt_i PQ_i, \quad (61) \]

where \( 0 < wt_i < 1 \) denotes the relative weight of good \( i \) in the index, and \( PQ_I = PD_I \) and \( PQ_G = PD_G \). These weights are fixed according to the share of each of these goods in aggregate consumption in the base period.
The consumption price index for the rural sector is given by

\[ P_R = \sum_i w_r_i P Q_i, \]

whereas the consumption price indexes for urban unskilled and skilled workers are given by

\[ P_{UU} = \sum_i w_u_i P Q_i, \quad P_{US} = \sum_i w_s_i P Q_i, \]

(62)

where the \( w_{ri}, w_{ui} \) and \( w_{si} \) are relative weights with \( \sum_i w_{ri}, \sum_i w_{ui} \) and \( \sum_i w_{si} \) summing to unity.

Finally, the deflator of GDP at factor cost is given by

\[ PGDP_{FC} = \sum_i v_i P V_i, \quad v_i \equiv PV_i X_i / \sum_j PV_j X_j, \]

(63)

where, again, \( \sum_i v_i = 1 \).

### 2.6 Profits and Income

Firms’ profits are defined as revenue minus total labor costs. In the case of agricultural sector firms and urban informal sector firms, profits are given by

\[ PROF_i = PV_i V_i - W_i U_i, \quad \text{for } i = A, I. \]

(64)

Profits of private-urban sector firms account for both working capital costs and salaries paid to both categories of workers, as well as payroll taxes:

\[ PROF_P = PV_P V_P - (1+IL_{-1})(1+ptax_U)W_M U_P - (1+IL_{-1})(1+ptax_S)W_S S_P. \]

(65)

Firms’ income is equal to profits minus interest payments on loans for investment purposes. Firms’ income and profits are defined separately, because not all sectors are assumed to borrow on the credit market to finance investment. Specifically, we assume that only firms in the formal urban economy accumulate capital. Firms’ income can thus be defined as:

\[ YF_i = PROF_i, \quad \text{for } i = A, I, \]

(66)

\[ YF_P = PROF_P - IL_{-1} D L_{P,-1} - IF \cdot ER \cdot F L_{P,-1} - PRIVR, \]

(67)
where $IF$ is the interest rate paid on foreign loans (taken to be exogenous), $PRIVR$ is the flow of privatization expenditures (whose counterpart is a financing item of the government budget deficit), and $DL_P$ and $FL_P$ are the levels borrowed domestically and abroad by private urban firms for physical capital accumulation.\(^\text{11}\)

Commercial banks’ profits must also be taken into account. They are defined as the difference between revenues from loans to firms (be it for working capital or investment needs), income from government bonds, and interest payments on borrowing from the central bank plus interest payments on both households’ deposits and foreign loans:

$$
YF_{PB} = IL_{-1}[DL_{P,-1} + (1 + ptax_U)W_M U_P + (1 + ptax_S)W_S S_P + IB \cdot B^{B^{B^{B}}}] - IR \cdot DL_{-1}^{BC} - ID \sum_h DD_{h,-1} - IF \cdot ER \cdot FL_{B,-1},
$$

where $ID$ is the interest rate on bank deposits, set by the central bank (see below).

Household income is based on the return to labor (salaries), distributed profits, transfers, and net interest receipts on holdings of financial assets. Households are defined according to the skills composition of the workforce and the sector of employment.

- There is one rural household, comprising all workers employed in agriculture.
- In the urban sector there are two types of unskilled households, those working in the informal sector and those employed in the formal sector.
- The fourth household consists of skilled workers employed in the formal urban economy (in both the private and public sectors).
- There is a capitalist-rentier household, whose income comes from firms’ earnings in the formal private sector, the agricultural traded sector and commercial banks.

\(^{11}\)Note that in the model corporate income taxes on private sector firms (which represented about 2.4 percent of Brazilian GDP in 1996) are not explicitly accounted for in calculating net income. Given our assumption that rentiers and capitalists hold these firms, we have consolidated corporate income taxes and household income taxes for this category of household.
We further assume that households in both the agricultural sector and in the informal urban economy own the firms in which they are employed—an assumption that captures the fact that firms in these sectors tend indeed to be small, family-owned enterprises.

Using (64) and (66), income of the agricultural and informal sector households is given by

\[ YH_i = \gamma_i TRH + PV_i X_i + ID \cdot DD_{i,-1} + IF \cdot ER \cdot FD_{i,-1}, \quad \text{for } i = A, I \]  

(69)

where \( \gamma_i \) is the portion of total government transfers (\( TRH \)) each group receives, \( DD_i \) domestic bank deposits, and \( FD_i \) foreign bank deposits.

Income of the urban formal unskilled and skilled households, depends on government transfers, salaries and interests on deposits (domestic and foreign); firms provide no source of income, because these groups do not own the production units in which they are employed:

\[ YH_{UF} = \gamma_{UF} TRH + (W_{MU} + W_{UG}) + ID \cdot DD_{UF,-1} + IF \cdot ER \cdot FD_{UF,-1}, \]  

(70)

\[ YH_{S} = \gamma_{S} TRH + (W_{SS} + W_{SG}) + ID \cdot DD_{S,-1} + IF \cdot ER \cdot FD_{S,-1}. \]  

(71)

Firms’ income (or net earnings) in the private urban sector goes to the capitalist-rentier household, who also receive commercial bank’s income, \( YF_{PB} \), and interest on deposits. Firms retain a portion \( re \) of their earnings for investment financing purposes, and transfer the remainder to the capitalist-rentier household. Thus, the capitalist-rentier household’s income is:

\[ YH_{KR} = \gamma_{KR} TRH + ID \cdot DD_{KR,-1} + IF \cdot ER \cdot FD_{KR,-1} \]  

\[ + IB \cdot BB_{KR,-1} + (1 - re)YF_P + YF_{PB}, \]  

(72)

where \( BB_{KR} \) denote government bond holdings by capitalists and rentiers, who are assumed to be the only category of households to hold such bonds.

### 2.7 Savings, Financial Wealth, and Investment

Each category of household \( h \) saves a fraction, \( 0 < srate_h < 1 \), of its disposable income:

\[ SAV_h = srate_h YH_h (1 - itax_h), \]  

(73)

where \( 0 < itax_h < 1 \) is the income tax rate applicable to household \( h \).
The savings rate is a positive function of the real interest rate on deposits:

\[ srate_h = s_{0,h} \left( \frac{1 + ID}{1 + PINF} \right)^{\sigma_{sav,h}}, \]  

(74)

where \( PINF = \Delta PLEV/PLEV_{-1} \) is the inflation rate in terms of the overall price index.

The portion of disposable income that is not saved is allocated to consumption:

\[ CON_h = (1 - itax_h)Y_H - SAV_h. \]

Finally, the total flow of savings of each household is channeled into the accumulation of financial wealth, \( WT_h \), which also accounts for valuation effects on the stock of foreign-currency deposits, \( FD_h \), associated with changes in the nominal exchange rate:

\[ WT_h = WT_{h,-1} + SAV_h + \Delta ER \cdot FD_{h,-1}. \]  

(75)

Capital accumulation occurs only in the private urban sector. The decision to invest is assumed to depend on several factors. First, there is a positive effect of the after-tax rate of return to capital relative to the cost of funds. Second, there is an accelerator effect, which aims to capture the impact of the desired capital stock on current investment. Third, there is a negative effect of the inflation rate, which may be viewed as a measure of macroeconomic instability, or of increased uncertainty about relative prices under high inflation, which makes investment decisions riskier. And fourth, there is a positive effect of the public capital stock in infrastructure. Formally, the investment function is given by

\[ \frac{Z}{K_{P,-1}} = \left( \frac{K_{INF}}{K_{INF,-1}} \right)^{\sigma_K} \left\{ \left( 1 + \frac{\Delta RGDP_{FC}}{RGDP_{FC,-1}} \right)^{\sigma_{ACC}} \right\} \]  

(76)

\[ \left( 1 + PINF \right)^{-\sigma_P} \left( \frac{(1 + IK)(1 - itaxKR)}{1 + IL} \right)^{\sigma_{IK}}. \]

where \( IK \) is the return to capital, \( IL \) the bank lending rate, and \( itaxKR \) is the net of the income tax rate that capitalists and rentiers are subject to.

The second term in equation (76) captures the accelerator effect on private investment of changes in real GDP measured at factor cost, \( RGDP_{FC} \), defined as
\[ RGDPP_{FC} = \sum_i PV_i X_i / PGDP_{FC}, \quad (77) \]

where \( PGDP_{FC} \), the deflator of GDP at factor cost, is defined in (??).

The rate of return on capital is defined as the ratio of profits to the stock of capital:

\[ IK = \frac{PROF_P}{PK \cdot K_P}. \quad (78) \]

Capital accumulation depends on the flow level of investment, \( Z \), and the depreciation rate of capital from the previous period, \( \delta_P \):

\[ K_P = K_{P,-1}(1 - \delta_P) + Z_{-1}, \quad (79) \]

where \( 0 < \delta_P < 1 \).

\section*{2.8 Financial Sector}

In what follows we consider in turn the determination of the portfolio structure of households, the demand for credit by firms, and the behavior of commercial banks.

\subsection*{2.8.1 Households}

Each household allocates instantaneously its stock of wealth to either money (in the form of cash holdings that bear no interest), \( H_h \), domestic bank deposits, \( DD_h \), foreign bank deposits, \( FD_h \), or holdings of government bonds, \( BB_h \):

\[ WT_h = H_h + ER \cdot FD_h + DD_h + BB_h. \quad (80) \]

We assume that only capitalists and rentiers hold government bonds. Thus, in the above equation, \( BB_h = 0 \) for \( h \neq KR \).

The demand function for currency is taken to be proportional to total consumption, as a result of a “cash-in-advance” constraint:

\[ H^d_h = \psi_h CON_h, \quad (81) \]

where \( \psi_h > 0 \).\footnote{The assumption that the demand for cash depends on a “pure” transactions motive is a reasonable one in a low-inflation environment. In addition, we use this specification to estimate individual holdings of cash from the household survey, as explained below.}
The total demand for cash is thus
\[ H^d = \sum_h H^d_h. \tag{82} \]

The demand for interest-bearing assets by rentiers and capitalists proceeds in two stages. First, they allocate a fraction of their non-monetary wealth, \( WT_{KR} - H_{KR} \), to government bonds. Second, they allocate the remaining part of wealth, between domestic and foreign currency deposits. For all other households, since they do not hold government bonds, their portfolio choices are limited to the second stage.

Formally, the demand for government bonds by the capitalist-rentier household depends on prevailing interest rates, in standard fashion:
\[
\frac{BB^d_{KR}}{WT_{KR} - H_{KR}} = \Psi_K \frac{(1 + IB)^{\beta_K}}{(1 + ID)^{\beta_D}} [(1 + IF)(1 + depr)]^{-\beta_F}, \tag{83}
\]
where \( IB \) is the rate of interest on public bonds, \( \Psi_K \) a shift factor, and \( depr \) the expected rate of depreciation of the nominal exchange rate.

The portion of wealth that is not held in the form of noninterest-bearing currency and government bonds (for rentiers and capitalists) is allocated between domestic and foreign deposits. The relative proportions of holdings of each of these two categories of assets are taken to depend on their relative rates of return:
\[
\frac{DD_h}{ER \cdot FD_h} = \phi_{Bh} \left( \frac{1 + ID}{(1 + IF)(1 + depr)} \right)^{\sigma_{Bh}}. \tag{84}
\]

In solving the model, we use equation (84) to determine the optimal level of domestic bank deposits, whereas we use equation (80) to determine residually the level of foreign deposits, given (81) and (83).

2.8.2 Firms

Firms finance their investment plans, as defined above, through retained earnings and domestic \((DL_P)\) and foreign \((FL_P)\) loans:

\[ PK \cdot Z = \Delta DL_P + ER \cdot \Delta FL_{P,-1} + re \cdot YF_P. \]

Solving this equation for \( DL_P \) gives us the demand for bank loans:
\[
DL^d_P = DL_{P,-1} - ER \cdot \Delta FL_{P,-1} + PK \cdot Z - re \cdot YF_P. \tag{85}
\]
The path of foreign loans is set exogenously. This implicitly accounts for ceilings that firms may face in their access to foreign markets.

2.8.3 Commercial Banks

Commercial banks are required to keep a portion \(0 < r_{req} < 1\) of the deposits that they collect as reserve requirements, denoted \(RR\):

\[
RR = r_{req} \sum_h DD_h, \tag{86}
\]

where \(\sum_h DD_h\) denote total deposits from households. The balance sheet of commercial banks is

\[
NW_B = DL_P + BB^C + RR - \sum_h DD_h - DL^{BC} - ER \cdot FL_B, \tag{87}
\]

where \(NW_B\) is the net worth of commercial banks, \(\sum_h DD_h\) domestic deposits, \(DL^{BC}\) borrowing from the central bank, and \(ER \cdot FL_B\) foreign loans (measured in domestic currency terms), \(DL_P\) loans to the private sector, and \(BB^C\) holdings of government bonds.

Equation (85) represents the demand for loans. We assume that the actual stock of loans is demand determined, and that banks borrow from the central bank, at a given interest rate, the required “shortfall” given their domestic deposit base and foreign borrowing \(FL_B\):

\[
\Delta DL^{BC} = \Delta DL_P + \Delta BB^C - (1 - r_{req}) \sum_h \Delta DD_h - ER \cdot \Delta FL_B. \tag{88}
\]

The demand for government bonds by commercial banks is given by

\[
\frac{BB^C}{DL_P} = \phi_C \left(\frac{1 + IB}{1 + LI}\right)^{\sigma_C}, \tag{89}
\]

where \(\phi_C > 0\). Thus, the demand for bonds by commercial banks (as a ratio of newt wealth) is positively related to the interest rate on these bonds and

\[\text{Note that capital losses associated with nominal exchange rate changes, } \Delta ER \cdot FL_{B,-1}, \text{ are accounted for in equation (68). An alternative to treating borrowing by commercial banks from central bank as endogenous and residually determined would be to take borrowing from the central bank as given and assume that excess liquid reserves adjust endogenously.}\]
negatively to their opportunity cost, that is, the lending rate. As discussed below, the supply of loans by the central bank is infinitely elastic at the prevailing interest rate, implying that (88) is always satisfied.14

Banks set both deposit and lending interest rates. The deposit rate, $ID$, is set equal to the cost of funds provided by the central bank, $IR$:

$$ID = IR.$$  

(90)

This specification implies that banks are indifferent as to their source of domestic funds—or, equivalently, deposits and loans from the central bank are viewed (at the margin) as perfect substitutes.

The loan rate is set as a premium over the marginal cost of funds. We assume that foreign borrowing is at the constrained level, so that marginal borrowing on world capital markets cannot occur. Thus, given (90), the marginal cost of funds is simply the cost of borrowing from the central bank, $IR$, taking into account as well the (implicit) cost of holding reserve requirements:

$$IL = \frac{IR}{1 - rreq} + PR,$$

(91)

where $PR$ denotes the finance premium, which is assumed to be set according to:

$$PR = \xi_{pr} \left[ \beta_{pr} \left( \frac{\delta_c(NW_{P-1} + DL_{P-1})}{DL_{P-1}} \right)^{-\gamma_{pr}} \right] + (1 - \xi_{pr})PR_{-1},$$

(92)

where $\gamma_{pr} > 0$, $0 < \xi_{pr} < 1$ is the speed of adjustment, $0 < \delta_c \leq 1$, and $NW_P$ is the net worth of private urban firms in nominal terms, defined as

14 Note that in the foregoing discussion we abstracted from “excess” liquid reserves, and considered only required reserves. In practice, commercial banks may also seek to hold “discretionary” reserves, in order to meet unexpected deposit withdrawals. Denoting by $ELIQ$, the demand for such reserves, equation (88) would be replaced by

$$\Delta DL^{BC} = \Delta DL^d_P + \Delta BB^C + \Delta ELIQ - (1 - rreq) \sum_h \Delta DD_h - \Delta FL_B \cdot ER,$$

with $ELIQ$ being determined by an equation similar to (89), with a negative sign on $IB$ (as a measure of the opportunity cost of holding liquid assets), or more generally, through a joint process involving the decision to supply credit and to hold government bonds.
\[ NW_P = PK \cdot K_P - DL_P - ER \cdot FL_P. \]

This specification captures the impact of collateralizable wealth on bank pricing decisions (see Bernanke, Gertler, and Gilchrist (2000)). The higher the value of the private capital stock net of foreign borrowing (that is, “pledgeable” collateral, \( PK \cdot K_P - ER \cdot FL_P \), or an “effective” fraction \( \delta c \) of that amount) relative to the amount of domestic loans, \( DL_P \), the higher the proportion of total lending that banks can recoup in the event of default by seizing borrowers’ assets. This reduces the finance premium and the cost of borrowing, stimulating the demand for credit. A large nominal exchange rate depreciation (that is, a rise in \( ER \)), would reduce firms’ net worth, thereby raising the cost of capital and leading to a contraction of private investment.\(^{15}\) There has not been much research on the link between collateral and bank interest rate spreads. As shown in the bottom panel of Figure 2, however, these spreads appear to follow a counter-cyclical pattern. This behavior is consistent with the view that in downswings, the value of borrowers’ collateral tends to fall and the risk of default increases; as a result, banks tend to charge a higher premium, as hypothesized in (92). In the simulations reported below, we will assess the sensitivity of our results to alternative values of the parameter measuring the sensitivity of the premium to changes in net worth, \( \gamma_{pr} \).

### 2.9 Public Sector

The public sector in our framework consists of the government and the central bank. We consider them in turn and relate changes in official reserves to the balance of payments.

\(^{15}\)An alternative justification for the finance premium equation (92) can be found in the models of credit market imperfections recently developed by Agénor and Aizenman (1998, 1999b). These models, following Townsend (1979), emphasize the importance of monitoring and enforcement costs of loan contracts that lenders face in a weak legal environment—as is so often the case in developing countries. In such an environment, these costs may be an increasing function of the amount lent (even against “good” collateral) because of congestion in courts and the difficulty of settling legal claims, which make it hard for lenders to actually seize borrowers’ assets in case of default. This approach amounts to specifying the premium as a positive function of the ratio of the amount lent \( DL_P \) over “effective” collateral.
2.9.1 Central Bank and Monetary Policy

To model monetary policy we assume that the central bank exerts a direct influence over the rate at which it supplies (marginal) funds to commercial banks. Thus, monetary policy is operated via the central bank’s control over a short-term interest rate, denoted $IR$. This instrument is the rate at which the central bank elastically supplies loans (or liquidity) to the commercial banking system in order for them to balance their overall sources of funds (including deposits and foreign borrowing) with their desired level of holdings of government bonds and loans to firms (which are demand determined). As noted earlier, the bank deposit rate is modeled as having a fixed relationship (in fact, one to one) with the official rate. Evidence of this relationship for Brazil is shown in the upper panel of Figure 1, which displays the behavior of deposit rates and the money market rate (itself closely linked to the Bank of Brazil’s repurchase rate) over the period 1995-2003. Monetary policy therefore operates to a large extent through commercial banks.

Note also that we could endogenize the official interest rate by specifying a monetary policy rule that relates $IR$ to deviations of output from target, as well as an output target, along the lines of the “flexible inflation targeting framework” that Brazil has adopted since June 1999 (see Bogdanski, Tombini, and Werlang (2000)). Such a rule could be specified, for instance, as

$$
\Delta IR = \kappa_1(PINF_{-1} - PINF^*) - \kappa_2\ln\left(\frac{RGDP_{-1}}{RGDP^T_{-1}}\right) + \kappa_3\Delta \ln ER_{-1}, \tag{93}
$$

where $\kappa_1, \kappa_2, \kappa_3 > 0$, $PINF^*$ is the government’s inflation target, $\Delta \ln ER$ the rate of depreciation of the nominal exchange rate, and $RGDP$ and $RGDP^T$ denote the actual and trend values of real GDP. Such a rule would be defined as “backward-looking”; by using the one-period ahead inflation rate, $PINF_{+1}$, instead of $PINF$ would make it forward-looking and more consistent with a “true” inflation targeting rule (see Agénor (2002b)).

From the balance sheet of the central bank, its net worth, $NW_{CB}$, is given by

$$
NW_{CB} = DL^{BC} + ER \cdot FF - MB, \tag{94}
$$

where $DL^{BC}$ denotes loans to commercial banks, and $FF$ the stock of foreign reserves, taken as exogenous. Because the supply of loans (or borrowed reserves) is perfectly price elastic at the interest rate $IR$, and because the
exchange rate floats freely, the base money stock is endogenous. Assuming that capital gains and losses on reserves are not monetized, changes in the base money stock are thus given by

\[ MB = MB_{-1} + \Delta DL^{BC}. \]  

(95)

Assuming no operating costs, net profits of the central bank, \( PROF^{CB} \), are given by the sum of interest receipts on loans to commercial banks (at the rate \( IR \), treated as exogenous) and interest receipts on holdings of foreign assets:

\[ PROF^{CB} = IR \cdot DL^{BC}_{-1} + IF_{ER} \cdot FF. \]  

(96)

where \( IF_{G} \) is the interest rate on government foreign loans. We assume in what follows that net profits of the central bank are transferred to the government.

Finally, given (94) and (95), the central bank’s net worth evolves over time according to:

\[ NW_{CB} = NW_{CB,-1} + \Delta ER \cdot FF, \]  

(97)

where the last term represents valuation effects. Put differently, exchange rate changes that affect the domestic-currency value of the central bank’s stock of foreign reserves do not affect the monetary base; these capital gains and losses are instead absorbed via changes in the central bank’s net worth.

2.9.2 Government

We assume that government expenditures consist of government consumption, which only has demand-side effects, and public investment, which has both demand- and supply-side effects. Public investment consists of investment in infrastructure, education, and health.\(^{16}\) We define investment in infrastructure as the expenditure affecting the accumulation of public infrastructure capital, which includes public assets such as roads, power plants and railroads. Investment in education affects the stock of public education capital, which consists of assets such as school buildings and other infrastructure affecting skills acquisition, but does not represent human capital. In a

\(^{16}\)It should be noted that this treatment of public investment differs from standard data classification reported in national accounts; in many instances these investments are classified as current expenditures.
similar fashion, investment in health adds to the stock of public assets such as hospitals and other government infrastructure affecting health.

Government saving is defined as minus the government budget deficit:

\[-DEF = (PV_GX_G - W_{UG}U_G - W_{SG}S_G) + PROF^{CB} \]  

\[+TXREV - TRH - G \]  

\[-IF \cdot ER \cdot FL_{G,-1} - IB \cdot BB_{-1}, \]  

where $BB$ denotes the total stock of bonds held by banks and households:\(^{17}\)

\[BB = BB_{KR} + BB^C. \]  

The term in parentheses represents profits by the government from sales of the public good. $TXREV$ denotes total tax revenues whereas $TRH$ is total government transfers to households. $G$ represents total government expenditures. $PROF^{CB}$ represent profits from the central bank. The final two terms in the government budget include interest payments on loans from abroad, and interest payments on government bonds held by commercial banks and the public.

Using the definition of net profits of the central bank given in equation (96), government saving can be rewritten as

\[-DEF = (PV_GX_G - W_{UG}U_G - W_{SG}S_G) \]  

\[+TXREV - TRH - G - IF \cdot ER(FL_{G,-1} - FF) \]  

\[+IR \cdot DL_{BC} - IB \cdot BB_{-1}. \]  

Total tax revenues, $TXREV$, consist of revenue generated by import tariffs, sales taxes, income taxes, and payroll taxes:

\[TXREV = ER \sum_{i=A,P} wpm_i tm_i M_i + \sum_i dtax_i PX_i X_i + itax_{KR} Y H_{KR} \]  

\[+itax_r(Y H_{AT} + Y H_{AN}) + itax_{UU}(Y H_{UF} + Y H_S) \]  

\[+ptax_U W_M U_P + ptax_{S S} W_{S S} P. \]

\(^{17}\)Note that in the above setting total demand for government bonds consists of demand by capitalists and commercial banks. Neither the central bank, nor non-residents, are assumed to hold government bonds. These modifications can be easily added.
Government expenditure is defined as investment in infrastructure, $I_{INF}$, investment in health, $I_H$, investment in education, $I_E$, and other current expenditures besides labor costs, $G_C$, which are all considered exogenous policy variables:

$$ G = I_{INF} + I_E + I_H + G_C. \tag{102} $$

Government investment increases the stock of public capital in either infrastructure, education or health. The stock of public capital in education includes items such as school buildings, whereas the stock of health capital includes hospitals and the like. Infrastructure capital includes all other stocks of public property, such as roads, railroads, and power plants. Accumulation of each type of capital is defined as:

$$ K_i = K_{i,-1}(1 - \delta_i) + \frac{I_{i,-1}}{PQ_{P,-1}}, \text{ where } i = INF, H, E, \text{ and where } 0 < \delta_i < 1. \tag{103} $$

Infrastructure and health capital affect the production process in the private sector as they both combine to produce the stock of government capital, $K_G$:

$$ K_G = CES(K_{INF}, K_H). \tag{104} $$

The government deficit, net of privatization revenues, $PRIVR$, is financed by either an increase in foreign loans, or by issuing bonds:

$$ DEF - PRIVR = ER \cdot \Delta FL_G + \Delta BB. \tag{105} $$

Equivalently, the supply of government bonds is given by

$$ BB^s = BB^s_{-1} + DEF - PRIVR - ER \cdot \Delta FL_G. \tag{106} $$

Finally, the net worth of the government, $NW_G$, is defined as:

$$ NW_G = PK(K_G + K_E) - BB^s - ER \cdot FL_G. \tag{107} $$

From (94) and (107), the net worth of the consolidated public sector, $NW_{PS}$, is given by

$$ NW_{PS} = PK(K_G + K_E) + DL^{BC} - BB^s + ER \cdot (FF - FL_G) - MB. \tag{108} $$
2.10 Balance of payments and the exchange rate

Because foreign reserves are constant, the balance of payments constraint implies that any current account surplus (or deficit) must be compensated by a net flow of foreign capital, given by the sum of changes in households’ holdings of foreign assets, $\sum h \Delta FD_h$, changes in foreign loans made to the government, $\Delta FL_G$, and to private firms, $\Delta FL_P$ (both taken to be exogenous), changes in loans to domestic banks, $\Delta FL_B$, all measured in foreign-currency terms:\(^{18}\)

$$0 = \sum_{i=A,P} (wpe_i E_i - wpm_i M_i) + IF \sum_h FD_{h,-1}$$

$$-IF \cdot FL_{P,-1} - IF_G(FL_{G,-1} - FF) - IF \cdot FL_{B,-1}$$

$$-\sum_h \Delta FD_h + \Delta FL_G + \Delta FL_P + \Delta FL_B.$$

Equation (109) determines implicitly the equilibrium nominal exchange rate. When solving the model, we actually use (109) to solve for $E_P$; the equation for $E_P$, (44) is then used to solve for $PE_P$ and the identity (48) is used to obtain the nominal exchange rate as $ER = PE_P/wpe_P$.

Another issue related to the exchange rate is the treatment of the expected nominal depreciation rate, $depr$, which affects portfolio decisions and the pricing rule of commercial banks. We assume that the expected rate of depreciation increases when domestic inflation (given in (??)) exceeds foreign inflation, $FINFL$, measured in domestic-currency terms, with a one-period lag:

$$depr = \chi[PINF_{-1} - (FINFL_{-1} + \Delta ER_{-1}/ER_{-2})],$$

where $\chi > 0.19$

\(^{18}\)It is not necessary, in fact, to set $\Delta FF$ equal to zero; it can simply be made exogenous. Doing so would allow the model to account for central bank intervention aimed at managing the exchange rate.

\(^{19}\)Alternatively, it could be assumed that expectations are forward looking (or, more precisely, model consistent), so that the expected depreciation rate is equal to the one-period ahead “actual” rate, as derived from the model itself. This, however, is a lot more involved from a computational standpoint; see for instance Thissen and Lensink (2001).
2.11 Currency and Bond Market Equilibrium

The monetary base, $MB$, consists of the supply of currency in circulation, $H^s$, and reserve requirements, $RR$. Because we assume that the supply of loans to commercial banks by the central bank is infinitely elastic at the interest rate $IR$, and that $DL^{BC}$ is determined by (88), the supply of currency is given by, using (86):

$$H^s = MB - rreq \sum_h DD_h.$$  

Equality between the supply and demand for cash requires that, using (82):

$$H^s = H^d = \sum_h H^d_h.$$  \hspace{1cm} (111)

When solving the model, the equilibrium condition (111) is dropped from the system as a result of Walras’ law—if all other markets but the money market are in continuous equilibrium, then the money market must be in continuous equilibrium as well. \(^{20}\) That this is indeed the case is checked automatically in the numerical solutions that we report below.

Finally, the interest rate that equilibrates the market for government bonds, $IB$, is given as the solution of

$$BB^s = BB^d_{KR} + BB^C,$$  \hspace{1cm} (112)

or, using (83) and (89):

$$BB^s = \phi_C DL_P \frac{1 + IB}{1 + IL} \sigma_C$$  

$$+ \Psi_K (WT_{KR} - H_{KR}) \frac{(1 + IB)^{\beta_{KB}}}{(1 + ID)^{\beta_{KD}}} [(1 + IF)(1 + depr)]^{-\beta_{KF}}.$$  \hspace{1cm} (113)

In the actual solution of the model, we use (83) to solve for $BB^d_{KR}$, and equation (106) for $BB^s$. We then use the identity (112) to solve for $BB^C$, and invert equation (89) to solve for $IB$.

The financial balance sheets of each group of agents are presented in summary form in Table 1. The logical structure of IMMPA-Brazil is summarized in Figure 2.

\(^{20}\)Note that alternatively, we could have dropped the equilibrium condition of the bonds market and solved the money market equilibrium condition for interest rate on government bonds.
3 Poverty and Income Distribution Indicators

Two measures of income distribution are generated directly from IMMPA: the Gini coefficient and the Theil inequality index. Both are based on the six categories of households that were identified earlier, that is, workers located in the rural traded sector, rural non-traded sector, urban (unskilled) informal economy, urban unskilled formal sector, urban skilled formal sector, and capitalists-rentiers. Formally, they are defined as

\[
\text{Gini} = \frac{1}{2n^2} \cdot YH_M \sum_i \sum_j |YH_i - YH_j|, \quad i, j = A, UI, UF, S, KR,
\]

where \( n = 6 \) is the number of household categories and \( YH_M = YH_i/n \) is the arithmetic mean level of disposable income for household categories.

The Theil inequality index is measured as

\[
\text{Theil} = \frac{1}{n} \sum_i \frac{YH_i}{YH_M} \log\left(\frac{YH_i}{YH_M}\right), \quad i = A, UI, UF, S, KR,
\]

and other variables are as defined above. We also calculate these two indicators using consumption, instead of disposable income.

Following a shock, IMMPA generates three measures for these indicators (as well as those derived from household surveys, as discussed below): a short-term measure (first two periods following a shock), a medium-term measure (between 3 and 5 periods), and a long-term measure (between 6 and 10 periods).

To assess the poverty effects of alternative shocks, we link IMMPA to a household income and expenditure survey. Our poverty indexes are the poverty headcount index (the ratio of the number of individuals in the group whose income is below the poverty line to the total number of individuals in that group. The poverty gap index is defined as:

\[
P_G = \frac{1}{n} \cdot YH^* \sum_{k=1}^{n} (YH^* - YH_k),
\]

\[\text{Gini} = \frac{1}{2n^2} \cdot YH_M \sum_i \sum_j |YH_i - YH_j|, \quad i, j = A, UI, UF, S, KR,\]

where \( n = 6 \) is the number of household categories and \( YH_M = YH_i/n \) is the arithmetic mean level of disposable income for household categories.

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\[
P_G = \frac{1}{n} \cdot YH^* \sum_{k=1}^{n} (YH^* - YH_k),
\]
where \( k \) is an individual whose income is below the poverty line, \( n \) is the total number of people in the group below the poverty line, \( YH_k \) is the income of individual \( k \), and \( YH^* \) is the poverty line.

The procedure for calculating these poverty and distributional indicators is described at length in Agénor, Izquierdo, and Fofack (2003) and Agénor and Grimm (2003). It can be summarized as follows:

- **Step 1.** Classify the data in the household survey into the categories of households contained in mini-IMMPA. Here, in contrast to the low-income IMMPA prototype, there are only five categories of households—workers in the rural sector, those in the urban (unskilled) informal economy, urban unskilled workers in the formal sector, urban skilled workers in the formal sector, and capitalists-rentiers.

- **Step 2.** Following a shock, generate real growth rates in per capita consumption and disposable income for all five categories of households, up to the end of the simulation horizon (say, \( T \) periods).

- **Step 3.** Apply these growth rates separately to the per capita (disposable) income and consumption expenditure for each household in the survey. This gives a new vector of absolute income and consumption levels for each group.

- **Step 4.** Calculate poverty and income distribution indicators, using the new absolute nominal levels of income and consumption for each individual and each group, and after updating the initial rural and urban poverty lines to reflect increases in rural and urban price indexes.

- **Step 5.** Compare the post-shock poverty and income distribution indicators with the baseline values to assess the impact of the shock on the poor.

4 Data and Calibration

This section briefly reviews the structure of the financial SAM that underlies IMMPA-Brazil, the household survey data that we use to link the macro component to our poverty and income distribution assessments, and the parameter values that we used to calibrate the behavioral equations. A detailed
description of the data and adjustment procedures used to construct the financial SAM are provided in Haddad, Fernandes, Domingues, Perobelli, and Afonso (2003). The model itself is solved using a combination of GAMS and Excel; the computer programs that we use are described in a separate note (see van der Mensbrugghe (2003)).

4.1 The Financial SAM

To build the necessary data to calibrate IMMPA-Brazil involved two steps. First, a balanced aggregate SAM was constructed. Second, using the aggregate SAM and additional structural data, we constructed a balanced disaggregated SAM. This procedure guarantees that the disaggregated SAM matches the aggregate SAM, and provides controls over totals for each block.

Brazilian national accounts data for 1996 were used to compile the macro data for the real part of the SAM. We collected aggregate data for intermediate consumption, exports, imports, investment (capital formation plus inventory changes), output taxes, import taxes, household consumption, government consumption, wage taxes, wages, and profits. Wage taxes are the required and imputed payments over labor and other payments to workers. Wages are the sum of labor payments and payments to autonomous workers. Profits are the total of gross surplus by activities. Working capital requirements were obtained as a residual. Information about direct taxes and property taxes, transfers to households (social security payments and other benefits) and interest payments (domestic and foreign) were taken from public administration accounts. Government financial allocation on domestic banks and foreign banks were also obtained, related to domestic interest payments and foreign interest payments.

Financial data used in the aggregate SAM were obtained from the database of the Central Bank of Brazil: currency in circulation, domestic deposits and bonds held by households; and domestic banks’ holdings of domestic bonds. The allocation of domestic banks assets’ were completed with information about profits, credit to the private sector, changes in bank reserves and holdings of foreign bonds. Foreign financing to domestic firms (the variable $FL_P$ defined above) is calculated in “net” terms by adding loans by foreign banks to domestic firms (for investment purposes) plus foreign direct investment (plus stocks and derivatives) minus domestic bonds issued by domestic firms. Foreign loans to government are obtained directly from the balance of payments.
The initial (unbalanced) aggregate SAM was obtained from the initial
data, then a posterior (balanced) aggregate SAM was obtained by the application
of a RAS procedure, to square out statistical errors. Changes in each
cell, from the unbalanced to the balanced aggregate SAM, were checked to
ensure consistency.

The second step was to obtain a more detailed financial SAM, disaggregating
relevant cells into their components. As noted earlier, in IMMPA-Brazil,
households are separated in five groups (rural household, urban informal
household, urban unskilled labor household, urban skilled labor household
and rentier household). Goods are disaggregated into four sectors: agriculture,
informal sector, private formal sector and public sector. Labor payments are
disaggregated in two components, skilled and unskilled labor.

The main data sources for compiling the disaggregated and sectoral informa-
tion are the available input-output tables for Brazil. Sales and purchases
for up to 42 sectors were available; this information was mapped into the four
IMMPA sectors. The agriculture and public sectors were mapped directly
to the IMMPA classification. A mapping structure was created from PNAD
household survey data (see the description below) in order to separate formal
and informal activities. Shares in the industry and services sectors were used
to measure the informal economy; the private formal sector was constructed
as a residual. This mapping was also used to establish the distribution of
household consumption and the composition of foreign trade. Production
taxes by sector were derived from the estimated production, taking into ac-
count that the informal activity pays no taxes. Import taxes were allocated
to reflect import flows. Wage taxes were allocated to sectors using the ef-
f ective tax rate for agriculture, with the residual tax revenue allocated to
the private and public sectors, in line with labor payments in these sectors
(by definition, the informal economy pays no wage taxes). Borrowing for
short-term working capital needs by the urban private sector was calculated
by taking into account the sector’s wage payments.

Following the cash-in-advance specification of money demand by house-
holds described above (see (81)), the allocation of currency in circulation and
domestic bank deposits followed household consumption shares. Direct taxes
were allocated in the same way, taking into account that urban informal sec-
tor households do not pay direct taxes. By assumption, all government bonds
were assumed to be held by capitalists-rentiers. Finally, PNAD survey data
were used to derive the composition of government transfers to households.

A preliminary, unbalanced disaggregate SAM showed differences in rows
and column sums in the various sectors and households blocks. An important discrepancy was between households’ income and expenditures. The estimated income for each household group was used as a benchmark to adjust the expenditure on goods. A RAS procedure was implemented to adjust the household consumption block, and subsequently the intermediate consumption block.

Other stock data, on household financial wealth and physical capital of the government and the private sector, were also necessary to calibrate IMMPA-Brazil. Some information on these stocks was obtained from the same sources from which the flow data were taken. Data for the stock of public capital in infrastructure, and the private capital stock, were taken from the IPEA (Instituto de Pesquisa Economica Aplicada) database. To calculate data for the stock of public capital in education and health, we used flow data from the government budget on these components, and a perpetual inventory method (with an annual depreciation rate set at 4 percent) to calculate them.

4.2 The Household Survey Data

To simulate the impacts of policy and exogenous shocks on poverty and income distribution in the IMMPA-Brazil we used two Brazilian household surveys: the Pesquisa Nacional por Amostra de Domicílios – PNAD (National Household Survey) and the Pesquisa de Padrões de Vida – PPV (Living Standard Survey). The PNAD is the main Brazilian household survey, conducted by the Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia e Estatística – IBGE since 1976. The interviews are carried out in October and the information is relative to September. In each year the PNAD interviews around 100,000 households, randomly selected, in the whole country. The number of visits to households in PNAD is limited to one, making it difficult for someone to capture short run fluctuations in the household income. Even though PNAD does not investigate consumption expenditures patterns of households, it contains a very rich information set on personal and household characteristics, such as those related specifically to housing (e.g. quality, size and ownership), durable goods, family composition, income, location, demography, education, and work status for each member of the family. The information set on work status permits us to classify the households into the income groups of IMMPA-Brazil. The PPV was carried out by IBGE in 1996. It contains information (also available in PNAD) on personal and household characteristics. Moreover, it has rich information on patterns of
households consumption expenditures. PPV, however, has a limited coverage when compared to PNAD: it has been conducted only in the Southeast and Northeast regions (urban and rural areas), and the sample size is relatively small (around 5,000 households). Estimates from PNAD for the year 1996 are used in simulations for income-based indicators, while PPV is used in simulations for consumption-based poverty and inequality measures. When using PPV, the entire sample was considered, but in the PNAD case, for operational reasons, a representative sub-sample of 10% of the original sample was drawn. The size of the sub-sample from PNAD includes around of 10,000 households and the whole PPV sample 5,000 households. To classify the samples into the categories of households used in IMMPA-Brazil, we used information on years of schooling and occupational status for the head each household. The division between skilled and unskilled workers was based on the years of schooling variable. Those workers with, at least, one year of high school (9 or more years of schooling) were considered skilled, and those with less than 9 years of schooling were considered unskilled. To distinguish between rural and urban workers we used the activity sector (agriculture vs. non-agriculture), instead of residence area (rural vs. urban). Finally, the nature of urban employment was considered formal or informal according to both occupational status and years of schooling of the workers. When the head of the household was unemployed, we used information on the last job. So, the household classification into the IMMPA-Brazil income categories is as follows:

- **Rural sector group.** It is formed by all households whose head works in agricultural activities.

- **Unskilled informal group.** It is formed by all households whose head is unskilled, works in non-agricultural activities and does not have a formal labor contract.

- **Unskilled formal group.** It is formed by a) all households whose head is unskilled and has a formal labor contract and his job is in the non-agricultural and non-public sector; and b) all households whose head is an unskilled public server.

- **Skilled group.** It is formed by a) all households whose head is skilled, works in the non-agricultural and non-public sector; b) all households whose head is a skilled public server.
• **Capitalists-rentiers group.** It is formed by all households whose head is an employer.

The urban poverty line was fixed in R$ 56,00, corresponding to half minimum wage of September 1996. In the rural area the poverty line was fixed in 60 percent of the urban poverty line (R$ 33,60). Figure 3 shows the average household per capita income for each IMMPA income category for 1992, 1996 and 2001. Between 1992 and 1996, real income increased for all groups, whereas between 1996 and 2001 it went down. For the whole period, formal workers' income (skilled and unskilled) recorded the smallest growth rate (about 10 percent), whereas the capitalists-rentiers group was the group that experienced the largest increase: a growth rate of about 42 percent of income. An interesting aspect refers to the fact that income for informal workers household is very close of income for unskilled formal workers household, indicating that the main difference is due to the qualification of workers, instead of the position in the urban labor market. It is worth to point out, however, that the household income includes the income of all the members of the household, as well as all the sources.

Figures 4 to 6 show the distribution of income within each group, as constructed from our sample of observations. The figures indicate that the log-normal distribution provides an adequate characterization of income dispersion within each group.

### 4.3 Parameter Values

We have estimated elasticities for the investment function (equation (76)). Annual data for the period 1970-2000 were collected from the IPEA database. The capital stock of the public administrations in construction was taken as a proxy for capital stock in infrastructure, $K_{INF}$, and the capital stock of firms and households was taken as a proxy for the private capital stock, $K_P$. Private fixed capital formation was used as a proxy for private investment, $Z$. Data on the operating surplus of firms was used to calculate the rate of return to private capital, $IK$ (see (78)). The net income tax rate that capitalists-rentiers are subject to, $itax_{KR}$, was obtained from the actual taxes paid by firms on their operating surplus, divided by firms' total revenue. Changes in the general price index (IGP-DI) was used to calculate the inflation rate, $PINF$. A log-linear transformation of equation (76) was estimated using an error-correction framework, following standard tech-
niques (see for instance Greene (2000)). The estimated results (which are discussed in more detail in Haddad, Fernandes, Domingues, Perobelli, and Afonso (2003)) yield the following elasticities: $\sigma_K = 0.860$, $\sigma_{ACC} = 2.054$, $\sigma_P = -0.021$, and $\sigma_{IK} = 0.022$. All these estimates are significant and have the expected sign, although the coefficient measuring the accelerator effect appears to be on the high side, compared to other estimates for Brazil.\(^{23}\)

5 High Interest Rates, Unemployment and Poverty

This section examines the impact of a transitory (one-period only) increase in the refinance rate that the central bank charges commercial banks, $IR$.\(^{24}\)

In what follows, we assume that both the minimum wage, $W_M$, and the wage rate paid to unskilled labor in the public sector, $W_{UG}$, are fully indexed to the consumer price index:

$$W_M = \omega_M \cdot PLEV, \quad W_{UG} = \omega_{UG} \cdot PLEV,$$

(114)

where $\omega_M$ and $\omega_{UG}$ measure real wages in constant terms.

A rise in the cost of liquid resources from the central bank leads commercial banks to raise by the same amount the interest rate on bank deposits (see 90); at the initial level of the risk premium (as given in (91)), the lending rate increases. This has two types of effects. First, because the effective cost of labor rises, firms in the urban formal sector reduce the demand for skilled and unskilled. This increases on impact the open unemployment rate for both categories of workers. Second, the higher cost of borrowing tends to lower private investment and capital accumulation. At the same time, the reduced demand for labor puts downward pressure on wages, mitigating therefore the increase in unemployment. The fall in the expected urban wage also lowers migration flows from rural areas; the supply of labor in the urban informal sector falls, pushing wages up. The reduction in wages in agriculture (due to the relative increase in the supply of labor) stimulates output growth.\(^{23}\)

\(^{23}\)Melo and Rodrigues (1998), in particular, found an elasticity of 1.157 for output growth.

\(^{24}\)Since the implementation of the Real Plan in July 1994, the manipulation of short-term interest rates has been the major instrument through which Brazil’s central bank conducts its monetary policy.
of both tradable and nontradable goods. The net effect is an increase in disposable income in agriculture and a reduction in income for both skilled and unskilled workers in urban areas.

6 Conclusions

In this paper we have developed a quantitative framework for analyzing the impact of adjustment policies on output, wages, unemployment, poverty and income distribution in Brazil. In doing so we modified and extended in several directions the low-income IMMPA prototype developed by Agénor, Izquierdo, and Fofack (2003). Specifically, we introduced several features that we believe are important to capture some of the most salient structural characteristics of the Brazilian economy, namely, open unskilled urban unemployment, congestion effects associated with the use of public infrastructure in urban areas, bond financing of public sector deficits, a flexible exchange rate, an interest rate-based monetary policy rule, and payroll taxation. After explaining in detail the components of the model, we described its underlying accounting framework (namely, the financial SAM on which it is based), the household survey data used to assess poverty and distributional effects, the choice of parameters, and the solution procedure. The properties of the model were illustrated by describing the effects of a temporary (one-period only) increase in the short-term official interest rate. We also performed some sensitivity analysis of the base case and highlighted the important role played by the commercial banks’ premium-setting equation, which relates the lending rate (determined as a markup over refinancing costs) to firms’ net worth.

The model can be used to address a variety of issues that are at the forefront of the policy agenda in Brazil. In particular, it can be used to examine the growth, employment, and poverty effects of a reallocation of public expenditure, with a comparison between changes in transfers, spending on infrastructure, and spending on education or health (as in Agénor, Izquierdo, and Fofack (2003)), an increase in the minimum change (as in Foguel, Ramos, and Carneiro (2001), and a reduction in the payroll tax rate on unskilled labor.
References


Neri, Marcelo, Gustavo Gonzaga, and Jose Marcio Camargo, “Efeitos Informais do Salario minimo e Pobreza,” Revista de Economia Politica, - (- 2000), -.


Appendix A
List of Equations

PRODUCTION

\[ X_j = V_j + \sum_i a_{ij} X_j \]  \hspace{1cm} (A1)

\[ V_A = \left[ \alpha_{XA} \left( \beta_{XA} U_A^{\rho_{XA}} + (1 - \beta_{XA}) K_G^{\rho_{XA}} \right)^{-\frac{1}{\rho_{XA}}} \right]^{1-\eta_{XA}} \]  \hspace{1cm} (A2)

\[ X_i = \alpha_{Ti} \left( \beta_{Ti} E_i^{\rho_{Ti}} + (1 - \beta_{Ti}) D_i^{\rho_{Ti}} \right)^{\frac{1}{\rho_{Ti}}} \text{ for } i = A, P \]  \hspace{1cm} (A3)

\[ V_I = \alpha_{XI} U_I^{\beta_{XI}} \]  \hspace{1cm} (A4)

\[ V_G = \alpha_{XG} \left( \beta_{XG2} S_G^{\rho_{XG2}} + (1 - \beta_{XG2}) U_G^{\rho_{XG2}} \right)^{\frac{1}{\rho_{XG2}}} \]  \hspace{1cm} (A5)

\[ V_P = \alpha_{XP} \left( \beta_{XP1} T_1^{\rho_{XP1}} + (1 - \beta_{XP1}) \frac{K_{G,-1}}{L_{U,-1}} \right)^{-\frac{1}{\rho_{XP1}}} \]  \hspace{1cm} (A6)

\[ T_1 = \alpha_{XP1} \left( \beta_{XP1} T_2^{\rho_{XP2}} + (1 - \beta_{XP2}) K_P^{\rho_{XP2}} \right)^{-\frac{1}{\rho_{XP2}}} \]  \hspace{1cm} (A7)

\[ T_2 = \alpha_{XP2} \left( \beta_{XP2} S_P^{\rho_{XP2}} + (1 - \beta_{XP2}) K_P^{\rho_{XP2}} \right)^{-\frac{1}{\rho_{XP2}}} \]  \hspace{1cm} (A8)

\[ RGDP_{FC} = \sum_i PV_i X_i / PGDP_{FC} \]  \hspace{1cm} (A9)

EMPLOYMENT

\[ U_A^d = \left( V_A^{\frac{\rho_{XA}}{1+\rho_{XA}}} \frac{1-\eta_{XA}}{w_A} \cdot \frac{1}{\alpha_{XA}^{\rho_{XA}}} \right)^{-\frac{1}{1+\rho_{XA}}} \]  \hspace{1cm} (A10)

\[ w_A = W_A / PV_A \]  \hspace{1cm} (A11)

\[ U_R^s = U_A^d \left( V_A, \frac{W_A}{PV_A} \right). \]  \hspace{1cm} (A12)

\[ U_R^s = U_R^s \cdot (1 + g_R) - MIGR \]  \hspace{1cm} (A13)

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\([25]\) The index \(i\) or \(j\) (respectively, \(h\)) is used below to refer to all production sectors (household groups, respectively), that is, \(A, G, I, P\) (\(A, UI, UF, KR, US, UU\), respectively), unless otherwise indicated.
\[ MIGR = \lambda_m \left[ U_{R,-1} \sigma_M \ln \left( \frac{Ew_U}{Ew_A} \right) \right] + \frac{U_{R,-1}}{U_{R,-2}} (1 - \lambda_m) MIGR_{-1} \] (A14)

\[ Ew_U = \theta_U W_{M,-1} + (1 - \theta_U) W_{I,-1} \] (A15)

\[ \theta_U = \frac{U_{R,-1}}{U_{F,-1} - U_{G,-1}} \] (A16)

\[ Ew_A = \frac{W_{A,-1}}{P_{R,-1}} \] (A17)

\[ U^d_P = T_1 \left( \frac{\beta_{XP1}}{\alpha_{XP1} w_M (1 + IL_{-1}) (1 + ptax_U)} \right)^{\sigma_{XP1}} \] (A18)

\[ U_U = U_{U,-1} (1 + g_U) + MIGR - SKL \] (A19)

\[ U^s_I = U_U - U^s_F \] (A20)

\[ \Delta U^s_F = \beta_F \left\{ \frac{U^d_P_{-1}}{U^s_{F,-1} - U^s_{G,-1}} \left( \frac{W_{M,-1}}{P_{UU,-1}} - \frac{W_{I,-1}}{P_{UU,-1}} \right) \right\} \] (A21)

\[ UNEMP_U = 1 - \frac{(U_G + U^d_P)}{U^s_F}. \] (A22)

\[ S^d_P = T_2 \kappa_s \left( \frac{\beta_{XP2}}{\alpha_{XP2} w_S (1 + IL_{-1}) (1 + ptax_S)} \right)^{\sigma_{XP2}} \] (A23)

\[ S = (1 - \delta_S) S_{-1} + SKL \] (A24)

\[ L_U = U_U + S. \] (A25)

\[ UNEMP_S = \frac{S - S_G - S^d_P}{S} \] (A26)

\[ W_M = w_M (PLEV)^{\text{ind}_M} \] (A27)

\[ W_I = \beta_{XI} \frac{V_I}{U^s_I} P_{VI} \] (A28)

\[ W_{SG} = \omega_{SG} P_{US} \] (A29)

\[ W_S = w_S (PIND_S)^{\text{ind}_S} (UNEMP_S)^{-\phi_S} \Omega^\phi_W \left( \frac{P_{US}}{P_{T2}} \right)^{\phi_2} \] (A30)

\[ SKL = \lambda_S \left[ \kappa_e \left( \frac{Ew_S}{Ew_U} \right)^{\sigma_W} (K_{E,-1})^{\sigma_E} \right] + (1 - \lambda_S) SKL_{-1} \] (A31)
\[ Ew_S = \theta_s \frac{W_{S-1}}{P_{US^{-1}}} \]  
(A32)

\[ \theta_S = \frac{S_{P^{-1}}}{S^{-1} - S_{G^{-1}}} \]  
(A33)

**SUPPLY AND DEMAND**

\[ INT_i = \sum_j a_{ij} X_j \]  
(A34)

\[ Q_i^s = \alpha_{Qi} \{ \beta_{Qi} M_i^{--Qi} + (1 - \beta_{Qi}) D_i^{--Pi} \}^{-1} \] for \( i = A, P \)  
(A35)

\[ Q_i^s = X_i \] for \( i = I, G \)  
(A36)

\[ Q_i^d = Q_i^d \] for \( i = G, I \)  
(A37)

\[ Q_A^d = C_A + G_A + INT_A \]  
(A38)

\[ Q_i^d = C_i + INT_i \] (solved for \( C_i \))  
(A39)

\[ Q_i^d = C_i + G_i + Z_i + INT_i \] for \( i = G, P \)  
(A40)

\[ C_i = \sum_h x_{ih} + \frac{\sum_h c c_{ih} (CON_h - \sum_j P Q_j x_{jh})}{P Q_i} \]  
(A41)

\[ G_i = g g_i \frac{G}{P Q_i} \] for \( i = A, G, P \)  
(A42)

\[ Z_i = z z_i \frac{Z \cdot PK}{P Q_i} \] for \( i = G, P \)  
(A43)

**TRADE**

\[ E_i = D_i \left( \frac{P E_i}{P D_i} \cdot \frac{1 - \beta_{Ti}}{\beta_{Ti}} \right)^{\sigma_{Ti}} \] for \( i = A, P \)  
(A44)

\[ M_i = D_i \left( \frac{P D_i}{P M_i} \cdot \frac{\beta_{Qi}}{1 - \beta_{Qi}} \right)^{\sigma_{Qi}} \] for \( i = A, P \)  
(A45)

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\[ ^{26} \text{As indicated in the text, in solving the model, given that equations (A36) and (A37) determine quantities } Q_I \text{ and } Q_G, \text{ respectively, we use equations (A39) and (A40) to solve residually for } C_I \text{ and } C_G, \text{ respectively. Equations (A41) are then solved for } PQ_I = PX_I \text{ and } PQ_G = PX_G, \text{ respectively.} \]
PRICES

\[ PV_i = V_i^{-1} \left\{ PX_i(1 - dtax_i) - \sum_j a_{ji}PQ_j \right\} X_i \]  \hspace{1cm} (A46)

\[ PE_i = wpe_iER, \text{ for } i = A, P \]  \hspace{1cm} (A47)

\[ PM_i = wpm_i(1 + tm_i)ER, \text{ for } i = A, P \]  \hspace{1cm} (A48)

\[ PX_i = PQ_i, \text{ for } i = I, G \]  \hspace{1cm} (A49)

\[ PD_i = PX_i, \text{ for } i = I, G, \]  \hspace{1cm} (A50)

\[ PX_i = \frac{PD_i D_i + PE_i E_i}{X_i}, \text{ for } i = A, P \]  \hspace{1cm} (A51)

\[ PQ_i = \frac{PD_i D_i + PM_i M_i}{Q_i}, \text{ for } i = A, P \]  \hspace{1cm} (A52)

\[ PT_1 = \frac{PT_2 T_2 + (1 + IL_{-1})(1 + ptax_U)W_M U_P}{T_1} \]  \hspace{1cm} (A53)

\[ PT_2 = \frac{PROF_P + (1 + IL_{-1})(1 + ptax_S)W_S S_P}{T_2} \]  \hspace{1cm} (A54)

\[ PK = \frac{PQ_G Z_G + PQ_P Z_P}{Z} \]  \hspace{1cm} (A55)

\[ PINF = \frac{PLEV - PLEV_{-1}}{PLEV_{-1}} \]  \hspace{1cm} (A56)

\[ PLEV = \sum_i wt_i PQ_i \]  \hspace{1cm} (A57)

\[ P_R = \sum_i wr_i PQ_i \]  \hspace{1cm} (A58)

\[ P_{UU} = \sum_i wu_i PQ_i \]  \hspace{1cm} (A59)

\[ P_{US} = \sum_i ws_i PQ_i \]  \hspace{1cm} (A60)

\[ PGDP_{FC} = \sum_i v_i PV_i \]  \hspace{1cm} (A61)

INCOME

\[ PROF_i = PV_i V_i - W_i U_i, \text{ for } i = A, I \]  \hspace{1cm} (A62)
PROF\_P = PV\_P V\_P \cdot (1 + IL_{-1}) (1 + ptax\_U) W\_M U\_P \cdot (1 + IL_{-1}) (1 + ptax\_S) W\_S S\_P \\
(A63)

\[ YF_i = PROF_i, \text{ for } i = A, I \]  \\
(A64)

\[ YF_P = PROF_P - IL_{-1} DL_{P,-1} - IF \cdot FL_{P,-1} ER - PRIVR \]  \\
(A65)

\[
YF_{PB} = IL_{-1} [DL_{P,-1} + (1 + ptax\_U) W\_M U\_P + (1 + ptax\_S) W\_S S\_P] + IB \cdot [A66]
-I \cdot DL^{BC}_{-1} - ID \sum_h DD_{h,-1} - IF \cdot ER \cdot FL_{B,-1}
\]

\[ YH_i = \gamma_i TRH + PV_i X_i + ID \cdot DD_{i,-1} + IF \cdot ER \cdot FD_{i,-1}, \text{ for } i = A, I \]  \\
(A67)

\[ YH_{UF} = \gamma_{UF} TRH + (W\_M U\_P + W\_U G\_U G) + ID \cdot DD_{UF,-1} + IF \cdot ER \cdot FD_{UF,-1} \]  \\
(A68)

\[ YH_S = \gamma_S TRH + (W\_S S\_P + W\_S G\_S G) + ID \cdot DD_{S,-1} + IF \cdot ER \cdot FD_{S,-1} \]  \\
(A69)

\[ YH_{KR} = \gamma_{KR} TRH + ID \cdot DD_{KR,-1} + IF \cdot ER \cdot FD_{KR,-1} \]  \\
+IB \cdot BB_{KR,-1} + (1 - re)YF_P + YF_{PB} \]

\[ (A70) \]

**CONSUMPTION, SAVINGS, AND INVESTMENT**

\[ CON_h = (1 - itax_h) YH_h - SAV_h \]  \\
(A71)

\[ SAV_h = srate_h (1 - itax_h) YH_h \]  \\
(A72)

\[ srate_h = s_{0,h} \left( \frac{1 + ID}{1 + PINF} \right)^{\sigma_{SAV,h}} \]  \\
(A73)

\[ WT_h = WT_{h,-1} + SAV_h + \Delta ER \cdot FD_{h,-1} \]  \\
(A74)

\[ Z = K_{P,-1} \left( \frac{K_{INF}}{K_{INF,-1}} \right)^{\sigma_K} \left\{ (1 + \frac{\Delta RGDP_{PC}}{RGDP_{PC,-1}})^{\sigma_{ACC}} \right. \]  \\
(A75)

\[ (1 + PINF)^{-\sigma_P} \left( \frac{(1 + IK)(1 - itax\_KR)}{1 + IL} \right)^{\sigma_{IK}} \} \]

\[ IK = \frac{PROF_P}{PK \cdot K_P} \]  \\
(A76)

\[ K_P = K_{P,-1} (1 - \delta_P) + Z_{-1} \]  \\
(A77)
FINANCIAL SECTOR

\[ H^d_h = \psi_h CON_h \] (A78)

\[ H^s = \sum_h H^d_h \] (A79)

\[ \frac{BB^d_{KR}}{WT_{KR} - H_{KR}} = \Psi_K (1 + IB)^{\beta_{KB}} (1 + ID)^{-\beta_{KD}} [(1 + IF)(1 + depr)]^{-\beta_{KF}} \] (A80)

\[ DD_h \frac{ER \cdot FD_h}{ER \cdot FD_h} = \phi_Bh \left( \frac{1 + ID}{(1 + IF)(1 + depr)} \right)^{\sigma_{Bh}} \] (A81)

\[ FD_h = (WT_h - H^d_h - DD_h - BB_h)/ER \] (A82)

\[ DL^d_P = DL_{P,-1} - ER\Delta FL_{P,-1} + PK \cdot Z - re YF_P \] (A83)

\[ RR = rreq \sum_h DD_h \] (A84)

\[ \Delta DL^{BC} = \Delta DL^d_P + \Delta BB^C - (1 - rreq) \sum_h \Delta DD_h - ER \cdot \Delta FL_B \] (A85)

\[ BB^C \frac{DL_P}{DL_P} = \phi_C \left( \frac{1 + IB}{1 + IL} \right)^{\sigma_C} \] (A86)

\[ NW_B = DL_P + BB^C + RR - \sum_h DD_h - DL^{BC} - ER \cdot FL_B \] (A87)

\[ ID = IR \] (A88)

\[ IL = \frac{IR}{1 - rreq} + PR \] (A89)

\[ PR = \xi_{pr} \left[ \lambda_{pr} \left( \frac{\delta_c (NW_{P,-1} + DL_{P,-1})}{DL_{P,-1}} \right)^{-\gamma_{pr}} \right] + (1 - \xi_{pr})PR_{-1} \] (A90)

\[ NW_P = PK \cdot K_P - DL_P - ER \cdot FL_P \] (A91)

PUBLIC SECTOR

\[ MB = MB_{-1} + \Delta DL^{BC} \] (A92)

\[ NW_{CB} = NW_{CB,-1} + \Delta ER \cdot FF \] (A93)

\[ PROF^{CB} = IR \cdot DL^{BC}_{-1} + IF_{G}ER \cdot FF \] (A94)
\[ -\text{DEF} = (P G X G - W U G G - W S G S G) \]  
\[ + T X R E V - T R H - G - I F G \cdot \text{ER}(F L G, - 1 - F F) \]  
\[ + R \cdot D L^{B C}_{-1} - I B \cdot B B_{-1} \]  
\[ G = I_{I N F} + I_H + I_E + G_C \]  
\[ (A95) \]

\[ T X R E V = \text{ER} \sum_{i=A,P} w p m_i t m_i M_i + \sum_i d t a x_i P X_i X_i + i t a x_{K R} Y H_i (A97) \]  
\[ + i t a x_r (Y H_{AT} + Y H_{AN}) + i t a x_{U U} (Y H_{UF} + Y H_S) \]  
\[ + p t a x_U W_M U_P + p t a x_S W_S S_P \]  
\[ N W_G = P K (K_G + K_E) - B B^* - \text{ER} \cdot F L_G \]  
\[ K_i = K_i, -1 (1 - \delta_i) + \frac{I_{i, -1}}{P Q i_{i, -1}}, \text{ with } i = I N F, H, E \]  
\[ (A98) \]

\[ K_G = \alpha_G \{\beta_G K_{I N F}^{\rho G} + (1 - \beta_G) K_H^{\rho G})^{\frac{1}{\rho G}} \]  
\[ (A99) \]

\[ N W_{P S} = P K (K_G + K_E) + D L^{B C} - B B^* + \text{ER} \cdot (F F - F L_G) - M B \]  
\[ (A100) \]

**BALANCE OF PAYMENTS AND THE EXCHANGE RATE**

\[ 0 = \sum_{i=A,P} (w p e_i E_i - w p m_i M_i) + I F \sum_h F D_{h, -1} \]  
\[ - I F \cdot F L_{P, -1} - I F_G (F L_G, -1 - F F) - I F \cdot F L_{B, -1} \]  
\[ - \sum_h \Delta F D_h + \Delta F L_G + \Delta F L_P + \Delta F L_B \]  
\[ (A101) \]

\[ \text{depr} = \chi [P I N F_{-1} - (F I N F_{-1} + \Delta E R_{-1} / E R_{-2})] \]  
\[ (A102) \]

**CURRENCY AND BOND MARKET EQUILIBRIUM**

\[ H^* = M B - r r e q \sum_h D D_h \]  
\[ (A103) \]

\[ B B^d = B B_{K R} + B B^C. \]  
\[ (A104) \]

\[ B B^s = B B^s_{-1} + \text{DEF} - P R I V R - \text{ER} \cdot \Delta F L_G \]  
\[ (A105) \]

\[ B B^s = \phi_C N W_B (\frac{1 + I B}{1 + I L})^{\sigma_C} \]  
\[ + \Psi_K (W T_{K R} - H_{K R}) (1 + I B)^{\beta_{K B}} (1 + I F) (1 + \text{depr})^{-\beta_{K F}} \]  
\[ (A106) \]
Appendix B
Variable Names and Definitions

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<td>H&lt;sub&gt;h&lt;/sub&gt;</td>
<td>Money held by household h</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
IB  Rate of interest on public bonds
IR  Cost of funds provided by the central bank
IK  Return from equities
IL  Interest rate for domestic loan
INT\textsubscript{i}  Intermediate good demand for good \text{i}
KE  Capital in education
KG  Public capital
KH  Capital in health
K\text{INF}  Capital in infrastructure
KP  Private capital
LU  Total size of the labor force in the urban sector
LAND  Land used in agricultural production
M\textsubscript{i}  Import of good \text{i} = A, P
MB  Money base
MIGR  Migration to urban area
NW\textsubscript{B}  Net worth of commercial banks
NW\textsubscript{CB}  Net worth of the central bank
NW\textsubscript{G}  Net worth of the government
NW\textsubscript{P}  Net worth of private urban formal firms
NW\textsubscript{PS}  Net worth of the consolodated public sector
Ω\textsubscript{W}  Reservation wage of skilled workers
PD\textsubscript{i}  Domestic price of domestic sales of good \text{i}
PE\textsubscript{i}  Price of exported good \text{i} = A, P
PGDP\textsubscript{FC}  Price deflator fo RGDP at factor cost
PIND\textsubscript{S}  Price index to which nominal wage of skilled labor in the private sector is indexed
PINF  Inflation rate
PINF\textsuperscript{*}  Government’s inflation target
PK  Price of capital
PLEV  Price level
PM\textsubscript{i}  Price of imported good \text{i} = A, P
PQi  Composite good price of good \text{i}
PR  Premium
PRIVR  Flow of privatization expenditure
PROF\textsubscript{i}  Profit by good \text{i} firm for \text{i} = A, I, P
PROF\textsubscript{CB}  Net profits of the central bank
PT\textsubscript{1}  Price of T1
PT\textsubscript{2}  Price of T2
$P_h$ Price index for household $h = US, UU, R$

$PV_i$ Value added price of good $i$

$PX_i$ Sale price of good $i$

$Q_i$ Demand of composite good $i$

$Q^d_i$ Aggregate demand for good $i$

$Q^s_i$ Quantity supplied in sector $i$

$RGDP_{FC}$ Real GDP at factor cost

$RGDP^T_{FC}$ Trend value of real GDP

$RR$ Reserve requirements

$S$ Skilled workers

$S_P^d$ Demand for skilled labor

$SAV_h$ Saving by household $h$

$SRate_h$ Saving rate for household $h$

$SKL$ New skilled workers

$S_P$ Skilled labor employed in private urban formal

$T_1$ Composite input from $T_2$ and unskilled labor

$T_2$ Composite input from capital and skilled labor

$TRH$ Transfers to households

$TXREV$ Tax revenues

$U_i$ Unskilled labor employed in sector $i = A, P, I$

$U_F$ Unskilled labor supply in the urban formal sector

$U_R$ Unskilled workers in rural economy

$U_U$ Unskilled workers in urban economy

$U^d_i$ Demand for labor in sector $i = A, I, P$

$U^s_i$ Supply of unskilled workers in the formal sector

$U^s_F$ Supply of labor in the informal sector

$U^s_R$ Labor supply in the rural sector

$UNEMP_U$ Rate of unskilled unemployment in the urban formal sector

$UNEMP_S$ Rate of skilled unemployment

$V_i$ Value added in good $i$

$W_i$ Nominal wage in sector $i = A, I$

$w_i$ Real wage rate in sector $i = A, I$

$W_M$ Nominal wage rate for unskilled labor in the urban private formal sector

$w_M$ Real wage rate for the unskilled labor in the urban formal private sector
\( W_S \) Nominal wage rate for the skilled labor in the private formal sector
\( w_S \) Real wage rate for the skilled labor in the private formal sector
\( W_{SG} \) Nominal wage rate for the skilled labor in the public sector
\( w_{SG} \) Real wage rate for the skilled labor in the public sector
\( W_{UG} \) Nominal wage rate for the unskilled labor in the public sector
\( WT_h \) Total wealth by household \( h \)
\( x_{ih} \) Subsistence level of consumption of good \( i \) by household \( h \)
\( X_i \) Production of good \( i \)
\( YF_i \) Income by good \( i \) firm for \( i = A, I, P \)
\( YF_{PB} \) Income by private bank
\( YH_h \) Household income for household \( h \)
\( Z \) Total investment
\( Z_i \) Investment demand for good \( i = G, P \)
**Exogenous Variables**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Definition</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>$dtax_i$</td>
<td>Indirect taxation of output in sector $i = A, G, I, P$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$ER$</td>
<td>Nominal exchange rate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$FINFL$</td>
<td>Foreign inflation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$FL_i$</td>
<td>Foreign loans to sector $i = P, G$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$G_C$</td>
<td>Government consumption</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$g_R$</td>
<td>Population growth in rural economy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$g_U$</td>
<td>Population growth in urban economy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$ID$</td>
<td>Interest rate on domestic deposits</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$IF$</td>
<td>Interest rate on foreign deposit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$IF_G$</td>
<td>Interest rate on government foreign loans</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$I_E$</td>
<td>Investment in education</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$I_H$</td>
<td>Investment in health</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$I_{INF}$</td>
<td>Investment in infrastructure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$itax_h$</td>
<td>Income tax rate for households $h$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$ptax_S$</td>
<td>Payroll tax rate for the skilled labor in the private formal urban sector</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$ptax_U$</td>
<td>Payroll tax rate for the unskilled labor in the private formal urban sector</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$S_G$</td>
<td>Skilled workers in public sector</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$tm_i$</td>
<td>Import tariff for good $i = A, P$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$U_G$</td>
<td>Unskilled workers in public sector</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$wpe_i$</td>
<td>World price of good $i$ export for $i = A, P$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$wpm_i$</td>
<td>World price of good $i$ import for $i = A, P$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Name</td>
<td>Definition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------</td>
<td>---------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$a_{ij}$</td>
<td>Input-output coefficient for $i = A, G, I, P$ and $j = A, G, I, P$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\alpha_{edu}$</td>
<td>Elasticity of skills acquisition to cost of education</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\alpha_G$</td>
<td>Shift parameter for public capital</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\alpha_{Qi}$</td>
<td>Shift parameter in composite good $i = A, P$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\alpha_{Ti}$</td>
<td>Shift parameter in transformation function between exported and domestic good $i$ production for $i = A, P$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\alpha_{X_i}$</td>
<td>Shift parameter in good $i$ production for $i = A, G, I, P$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\alpha_{XP1}$</td>
<td>Shift parameter in composite input of unskilled and skilled/capital composite input</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\alpha_{XP2}$</td>
<td>Shift parameter in composite input of skilled workers and private capital</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\beta_F$</td>
<td>Speed of adjustment for the supply of unskilled labor in the formal urban private sector</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\beta_G$</td>
<td>Shift parameter for public capital</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\beta_{Qi}$</td>
<td>Shift parameter in composite good $i = A, P$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\beta_{Ti}$</td>
<td>Shift parameter between exported and domestic production of good $i = P, A$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\beta_{X_i}$</td>
<td>Shift parameter in production of good $i = A, P, I$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\beta_{XG1}$</td>
<td>Shift parameter between labor and public capital in public production</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\beta_{XG2}$</td>
<td>Shift parameter between skilled and unskilled workers in public production</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\beta_{XP1}$</td>
<td>Share parameter between unskilled and skilled/capital composite input</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\beta_{XP2}$</td>
<td>Share parameter between skilled workers and private capital</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\beta_{KB}$</td>
<td>Money demand elasticity on government bonds</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\beta_{KD}$</td>
<td>Money demand elasticity on domestic rate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\beta_{KF}$</td>
<td>Money demand elasticity on foreign rate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$cc_{ih}$</td>
<td>How total nominal consumption by household $h$ is allocated to each type of good $i$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\kappa$</td>
<td>Shift parameter of depreciation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\psi_h$</td>
<td>Share of household $h$ in total consumption</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\delta_c$</td>
<td>Collateral parameter</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\delta_E$</td>
<td>Depreciation of education capital</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
\( \delta_H \) Depreciation of health capital
\( \delta_{INF} \) Depreciation of infrastructure
\( \delta_P \) Private capital’s depreciation rate
\( \delta_S \) Rate of “depreciation” or “de-skilling” of the skilled labor force
\( \xi_{pr} \) Partial adjustment coefficient for premium
\( \eta_{XA} \) Coefficient of returns to scale
\( \gamma_{Bh} \) Share of domestic deposits in total deposits for household \( h \)
\( \gamma_h \) Share of transfers allocated to household \( h = K, R, S, A, U, F, I \)
\( \gamma_{pr} \) Elasticity of premium to firms’ net worth position
\( g_{gi} \) Share of government expenditure on ggod \( i = A, G, P \)
\( ind_S \) Parameter used in determining nominal wage of skilled labor in the private sector
\( \kappa_e \) Shift parameter in skills acquisition function
\( \kappa_S \) Shift parameter for skilled private sector employment
\( \lambda_m \) Partial adjustment rate on migration
\( \lambda_{pr} \) Premium shift parameter
\( \lambda_s \) Partial adjustment rate on skills acquisition
\( \phi_{Bh} \) Proportion of domestic deposits held in total deposits
\( \phi_C \) Shift parameter for the demand for government bonds
\( \phi_i \) Parameters used in the calculation of nominal wage for skilled labor in the private sector for \( i = u, 1, 2 \)
\( pc \) Parameter used in the value added function of urban formal private goods
\( re \) Percentage of profits retained
\( \rho_G \) Substitution parameter for public capital
\( \rho_{Qi} \) Substitution parameter in composite good \( i = A, P \)
\( \rho_{ri} \) Parameter in production of good \( i = A, P \)
\( \rho_{Xi} \) Substitution parameter in production of good \( i = A, P \)
\( \rho_{XG1} \) Substitution parameter between workers and public capital in public production
\( \rho_{XG2} \) Substitution parameter between skilled and unskilled workers in public production
\( \rho_{XP1} \) Substitution parameter between unskilled and skilled/capital composite input
\( \rho_{XP2} \) Substitution parameter between skilled workers and private capital
\( rreq \) Reserve requirement ratio
\( \sigma_{ACC} \) Elasticity of investment to growth rate of real GDP at factor cost

\( \sigma_C \) Parameter in demand for government bonds equation

\( \sigma_{Bh} \) Domestic/foreign deposits elasticity for household \( h \)

\( \sigma_E \) Elasticity of skills acquisition to capital in education

\( \sigma_{IK} \) Elasticity of investment to return to capital

\( \sigma_K \) Elasticity of investment to gross growth rate of infrastructure capital

\( \sigma_M \) Elasticity of migration to wage differentials

\( \sigma_P \) Elasticity of inflation on investment

\( \sigma_{Qi} \) Elasticity of composite good \( i = A, P \)

\( \sigma_{sav,h} \) Parameter in the saving rate equation for household \( h \)

\( \sigma_{Ti} \) Elasticity of transformation between exported and domestic production of good \( i = A, P \)

\( \sigma_W \) Elasticity of skills acquisition to wage differential

\( \sigma_{XP_1} \) Elasticity of substitution between unskilled workers and composite input of skilled workers and private capital

\( \sigma_{XP_2} \) Elasticity of substitution between skilled workers and private capital

\( s_{0,h} \) Saving coefficient for household \( h \)

\( \Psi_K \) Shift parameter determining demand for bonds

\( \theta_U \) Share of urban unskilled workers employed in formal sector

\( \theta_s \) Initial ratio of the number of workers employed in the private sector

\( v_i \) Weight for sector \( i \) real GDP at factor cost price deflator

\( wt_i \) Initial share of good \( i \) in aggregate consumption

\( wr_i \) Initial share of good \( i \) in rural consumption

\( ws_i \) Initial share of good \( i \) in skilled workers’ consumption

\( wu_i \) Initial share of good \( i \) in urban unskilled workers’ consumption

\( zz_i \) Share of investment expenditure on good \( i = P, G \)
### Table 1
**Financial Balance Sheets**
(in domestic-currency terms, at current prices)

#### Households

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Assets</th>
<th>Liabilities</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cash holdings ((H))</td>
<td>Financial wealth ((WT))</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Domestic bank deposits ((DD))</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foreign bank deposits ((ER \cdot FD))</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government bonds ((BB_{KR}))</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### Firms

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Assets</th>
<th>Liabilities</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Stock of private capital ((PK \cdot KP))</td>
<td>Domestic borrowing ((DL_P))</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Foreign borrowing ((ER \cdot FL_P))</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Net worth ((NW_P))</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### Commercial Banks

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Assets</th>
<th>Liabilities</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Government bonds ((BB^{C}))</td>
<td>Domestic bank deposits ((DD))</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Loans to domestic firms ((DL_P))</td>
<td>Foreign liabilities ((ER \cdot FL_B))</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reserve requirements ((RR))</td>
<td>Borrowing from central bank ((DL^{BC}))</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Net worth ((NW_B))</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### Central Bank

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Assets</th>
<th>Liabilities</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Loans to commercial banks ((DL^{BC}))</td>
<td>Cash in circulation ((H))</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foreign reserves ((ER \cdot FF))</td>
<td>Reserve requirements ((RR))</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Net worth ((NW_{CB}))</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### Government

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Assets</th>
<th>Liabilities</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Capital in education ((PK \cdot K_E))</td>
<td>Government bonds ((BB))</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Capital in health ((PK \cdot K_H))</td>
<td>Foreign borrowing ((ER \cdot FL_G))</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Capital in infrastructure ((PK \cdot K_{INF}))</td>
<td>Net worth ((NW_G))</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### Consolidated Public Sector

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Assets</th>
<th>Liabilities</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Loans to commercial banks ((DL^{BC}))</td>
<td>Cash in circulation ((H))</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foreign reserves ((ER \cdot FF))</td>
<td>Reserve requirements ((RR))</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Capital in education ((PK \cdot K_E))</td>
<td>Government bonds ((BB))</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Capital in health ((PK \cdot K_H))</td>
<td>Foreign borrowing ((ER \cdot FL_G))</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Capital in infrastructure ((PK \cdot K_{INF}))</td>
<td>Net worth ((NW_{PS}))</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Figure 1
Brazil: Interest Rates and Cyclical Output, 1995-2003
(quarterly data)

Source: International Monetary Fund.

1/ Cyclical component is the log difference between manufacturing production and the Hodrick-Prescott trend of it.
Note: Exogenous variables are in capital letters.
Figure 3
Brazil: Average Household Income
(in Reais, at 2001 prices)

Source: Authors' calculations.
Figure 4
Brazil: Frequency Distributions of Households by Income Per Capita
in Agriculture and the Informal Sector

Agricultural sector

Informal sector

Source: Authors’ calculations.
Figure 5
Brazil: Frequency Distributions of Households by Income Per Capita in Urban Formal Sector

Source: Authors' calculations.
Figure 6
Brazil: Frequency Distributions of Capitalists and Rentiers
by Income Per Capita

Source: Authors' calculations.
Figure 7
5 Percentage Point Increase in Official Interest Rates
(Percentage deviations from baseline, unless otherwise indicated)

- Low elasticity of the risk premium
- Medium elasticity of the risk premium
- High elasticity of the risk premium

1/ Absolute deviations from baseline.
Figure 7 (concluded)
5 Percentage Point Increase in Official Interest Rates
(Percentage deviations from baseline, unless otherwise indicated)

- Low elasticity of the risk premium
- Medium elasticity of the risk premium
- High elasticity of the risk premium

1/ Absolute deviations from base line.