

Social Network Structure and Economic Performance: Theory and Evidence*

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Abstract. Based on a novel computational multi-agent model, we identify the key mechanisms allowing the social network structure, summarized by four key social capital dimensions (network degree, centrality, bridging and bonding social capital), to affect individuals' social trust, willingness to cooperate, economic performance and social utility. We then trace how the individual-level outcomes aggregate up to the society level. The model setup draws from the associated socio-economic theory and empirical findings for the Polish society following from our novel survey dataset. Model implications, summarized by aggregate-level comparative statics and individual-level correlations, are derived following a systematic simulation design. They are in agreement with the available cross-country data as well as provide intuitive additional implications (which cannot be tested yet due to insufficient data).

Keywords: social network structure, social trust, willingness to cooperate, economic performance, computational multi-agent model.

JEL Classification Numbers: C63, D85, J31, L14, Z13

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1 Introduction

The objective of this paper is to identify the key mechanisms allowing the social network structure to affect individuals' social trust, willingness to cooperate, economic performance and social utility, and to trace how these individual-level outcomes aggregate up to the society level. To this end, we study how social networks give rise to the accumulation of *social capital*, defined as the aggregate of resources accessible to individuals through their social networks (Bourdieu, 1986), and how in turn social capital enables the creation of trust and cooperation.

Even under Bourdieu's definition, however, social capital remains an ambiguous, complex concept. In this paper, we handle this complexity by considering four key types of individuals' social capital: (i) network degree, (ii) centrality, (iii) bridging and (iv) bonding social capital. To capture all four network characteristics as independent dimensions, a minimal model has to explicitly acknowledge individuals' heterogeneity not only in terms of their position in the social network, but also in terms of at least two additional individual traits. We consider the following two traits:

- *family location* f_i , with the presumption that social ties between individuals who are close to each other in terms of f_i represent (relatively strong and exclusive but economically less valuable) kinship ties whose aggregation represents the individual's stock of bonding social capital;
- *agent type* v_i , with the presumption that social ties between individuals who are distant in terms of v_i represent (relatively weak but economically profitable) bridging ties whose aggregation represents the individual's stock of bridging social capital.

The contribution of this study to the literature is to construct a novel computational multi-agent model, based on Watts and Strogatz (1998) network structure and extending it to incorporate the aforementioned quadripartite decomposition of social capital as well as accommodate several other findings from the associated socio-economic literature. The details of the model setup also draw from our empirical findings for the Polish society (Growiec, Growiec, and Kamiński, 2017), based on a unique, detailed survey dataset. Implications of the model, however, reach beyond the specificities of this particular society and should be tested at the cross-country level. While this may be partially hindered by the lack of internationally comparable data on the detailed social capital

measures, we make a first step in this direction by presenting some preliminary evidence from European Social Survey (ESS) data as well as confronting model outcomes with implications from theory.

We demonstrate that our computational agent-based model, whose properties have been analyzed following a systematic simulation design, is a useful tool for simulating social capital stocks, trust, cooperation, and economic performance at the aggregate and individual level in the economy. Assuming that different countries or communities may feature different topologies of social networks and exhibit different social norms (e.g., how much value is attached to social ties with family members), we investigate if these differences lead to varying levels of social capital, trust and cooperation in the economy and if there is a trade-off between aggregate social utility and economic performance which they ultimately convey. In particular we specify the conditions under which *small world* type networks of social ties (as observed in most real-life economies) can be socially optimal. We also address the micro–macro linkages, implicit in the model, by answering the question, how the aggregate variables affect individual-level trade-offs such as, e.g., the trade-off between individual social utility and economic performance.

Our key findings are as follows: (i) societies that either are globally better connected, exhibit a lower frequency of local cliques, or have a smaller share of family-based cliques, record relatively better economic performance; (ii) social utility presents a \cap -shaped relationship with network density and a negative relationship with the frequency of family-based local cliques; (iii) if contacts with family are highly valued in the society, then there is a trade-off between aggregate social utility and economic performance, and then *small world* networks are socially optimal, otherwise they are outperformed by highly diversified, inclusive networks; (iv) in dense networks, social ties are individually less valuable; (v) social trust is a functional substitute to social networks: in trustful societies, social ties are individually less valuable, and vice versa; (vi) in dense networks and trustful societies, there is a trade-off between individuals’ social utility and economic performance, and otherwise both outcomes are positively correlated in the cross section.

The remainder of the article is structured as follows. Section 2 presents the background literature and provides an overview of the most important empirical findings from our companion paper, [Growiec, Growiec, and Kamiński \(2017\)](#). Section 3 describes the model setup. Section 4 outlines the simulation design allowing for a systematic anal-

ysis of model properties. Section 5 discusses the impact of social network structure on aggregate-level variables. Section 6 discusses the results regarding individual-level correlations. Section 7 concludes.

2 Background Literature and Empirical Data

Social capital theory. The current paper adopts the following definition of social capital due to Bourdieu (1986): “social capital is the aggregate of the actual or potential resources which are linked to possession of a durable network of more or less institutionalized relationships of mutual acquaintance and recognition – or in other words, to membership in a group – which provides each of its members with the backing of the collectivity-owned capital, a ‘credential’ which entitles them to credit, in the various senses of the word.” (p. 128). The principal reason for accepting this purely network-based definition, widely shared in sociology (e.g., Lin, 2001; Kadushin, 2002; Li, Pickles, and Savage, 2005; Burt, 2005), is that it enables us to precisely delineate people’s objective behavior (maintaining social contacts with others) from social norms (trust, cooperation) which we treat as social capital outcomes rather than its dimensions. It is also important that this definition links the social networks people maintain to the resources that may be accessed through them (Bourdieu, 1986; Lin, 2001), because access to network resources is vital for the identification of linkages between social capital and individuals’ economic performance or social utility.

While Bourdieu’s definition of social capital provides a useful theoretical frame for our study, it does not precisely specify the structure of this concept, which in fact could be affected by a range of network features. Our choice of the four social capital dimensions (network degree, centrality, bridging and bonding social capital) is motivated as follows.

Firstly, the inclusion of *network degree* (the number of social ties a given individual maintains) as a dimension of social capital is obvious: more network resources should be available to individuals who maintain more social ties, at least on average. Secondly, in line with the “structural holes” argument due to Burt (1992), relatively more resources should also be available to the individuals who form a bridge between otherwise separated sub-networks (cliques) because they are crucial for the flow of information and all other resources in the network. By exploiting structural holes, individuals may gain a unique

position in their network and use it for their benefit. This motivates the inclusion of *network centrality* as our second social capital dimension. Thirdly, the associated literature points out that the access to network resources is also largely affected by the distinction between *bridging social capital* (social ties with dissimilar others) and *bonding social capital* (social ties with similar others), as first proposed by Putnam (2000). Both types of social ties are related to different resources, serving different purposes, and thus they should be viewed as conceptually distinct dimensions of social capital and not just opposite sides of the same spectrum. Ties with similar others are formed to satisfy the safety drive (the need for affiliation, emotional support, etc.) whereas ties with dissimilar others – the effectiveness drive (towards personal development, professional success, etc., Bowlby, 1969; Greenberg, 1991; Kadushin, 2002). Hence, in terms of our model, we expect bridging social capital to be more closely linked to individuals' economic performance, and bonding social capital – to their social utility.

Social capital, trust and willingness to cooperate. Social trust and willingness to cooperate are the key channels through which social capital may influence the economic performance and social utility of individuals and societies. According to Granovetter (2005), social networks affect economic outcomes because they affect the flow and quality of information, they are an effective source of reward and punishment, and they are therefore a context in which trust can emerge. This, in turn, has far-reaching consequences because trust is “essential for stable relations, vital for the maintenance of cooperation, fundamental for any exchange and necessary for even the most routine of everyday interactions” (Misztal, 1996, p. 12). At the same time, social networks are also the usual context in which people learn to cooperate with one another (Field, 2010), which then also affects their willingness to cooperate with strangers.

As the formation process of trust and cooperation happens in a social network, characteristics of this network can have an impact the outcomes. Dense networks – typically formed among similar individuals due to the homophily principle (Lazarsfeld and Merton, 1954; Lin, 2001) – are relatively less conducive to social trust because dense networks facilitate reputation formation and social control which are functional substitutes of social trust (Dasgupta, 1988). Conversely, sparse networks – relatively more likely to include social ties with dissimilar others and feature more “structural holes” and network bridges – convey relatively less information about the reputation of other people in the

network and are less efficient in imposing social control, and hence members of such networks need more social trust to behave cooperatively. However, social ties within such a network are more likely to provide non-redundant, potentially useful information, thus increasing the expected payoff of prospective cooperation (Granovetter, 2005). It has also been found that the extent and structure of individuals' social networks affects the magnitude of transaction costs they face, the possibility of implementing innovative (but risky) ideas in cooperation with others, and hence the individuals' overall cooperativeness and thrift (Inglehart and Baker, 2000; Florida, 2004; Klapwijk and van Lange, 2009).

In line with these findings, in our model we view social trust a key determinant of the probability of engaging in economic interaction with others. Once there is an interaction, however, it also matters if the agents choose to cooperate or not. We model this decision as a "prisoner's dilemma" game: both agents are better off when both cooperate than when both defect, but each of them is also individually tempted to defect. The model is calibrated so that an interaction where both agents defect is better than no interaction at all, but it is better not to interact at all than to interact, cooperate, and be cheated.

The simulation results obtained in this paper allow us to form an empirically testable hypothesis that societies which form diverse, inclusive networks should be more trustful and more willing to cooperate, and thus exhibit better economic performance, than societies which are permeated by visible and invisible barriers, fragmenting the networks into locally dense cliques of individuals who think alike and have similar sets of information and other resources. Unfortunately, sufficiently detailed and internationally comparable data on social network structure which could directly validate or falsify this hypothesis is yet to be collected. There is however plentiful macro-level empirical evidence justifying the robustness of links between social trust, cooperation and economic performance (see e.g., Knack and Keefer, 1997; Zak and Knack, 2001; Algan and Cahuc, 2010).

Social capital, earnings and subjective well-being. The linkages between social capital and economic performance or self-reported well-being (which, when compared to our model setup, amalgamates both economic performance and social utility) have been studied at the level of individuals, communities, regions and whole countries. The identified correlations and causal links may vary depending on the considered empirical operationalization of the social capital concept but are typically positive; a broad

overview of these results can be found in [Durlauf and Fafchamps \(2005\)](#), amongst other sources.

More specifically, at the macro level it has been found that bridging social capital, as opposed to bonding social capital, tends to go together with civil liberties, support for equality and democracy, and low corruption ([Putnam, Leonardi, and Nanetti, 1993](#); [Putnam, 2000](#)). On the other hand, “bonding social capital (as distinct from bridging social capital) has negative effects for society as a whole, but may have positive effects for the members belonging to this closed social group or network” ([Beugelsdijk and Smulders, 2003](#)). [Beugelsdijk and Smulders \(2003\)](#) proceed to show empirically that bridging social capital accelerates whereas bonding social capital retards economic growth across European regions.


At the micro level it has been found that social ties between dissimilar people (“weak ties”) are typically more helpful than ties between similar people (“strong ties”) for finding a job, being promoted, and earning higher wages ([Granovetter, 1973](#); [Podolny and Baron, 1997](#); [Mouw, 2003](#); [Słomczyński and Tomescu-Dubrow, 2005](#); [Franzen and Hangartner, 2006](#); [Growiec and Growiec, 2010](#); [Zhang, Anderson, and Zhan, 2011](#)). Strengthening this message, negative wage effects of social ties with similar others have been identified by [Franzen and Hangartner \(2006\)](#); [Sabatini \(2009\)](#); [Kim \(2009\)](#).

There also exists a wide range of studies confirming the importance of maintaining frequent social interactions, both with similar and dissimilar others, for individuals’ life satisfaction and happiness (e.g., [Winkelmann, 2009](#); [Alesina and Giuliano, 2010](#); [Kroll, 2011](#); [Leung, Kier, Fung, Fung, and Sproule, 2011](#); [Growiec and Growiec, 2014](#)).

Complementary to these results, [Burt \(2005\)](#) has argued that network centrality (i.e., possessing “structural holes” in one’s network) are positively related to individuals’ economic performance, creativity, social trust, and happiness.

Empirical results from [Growiec, Growiec, and Kamiński \(2017\)](#). In our companion paper, we use a novel survey dataset on a representative sample of the Polish population ($n = 1000$) to draw a detailed map of the four social capital dimensions and their links to social trust and willingness to cooperate (which we view as immediate social capital outcomes) as well as economic performance and subjective well-being (the ultimate outcomes). In this paper, these individual-level results are used in the specification of model setup and its parametrization.

Figure 1: Empirical relationships between the four dimensions of social capital as well as social trust, willingness to cooperate, and network distance.



Notes: ++ strong positive correlation, + positive correlation, - negative correlation, 0 no correlation. Thick lines denote robust correlations, i.e. the ones which survive also when controlling for the simultaneous effects of other social capital dimensions. “Distance” measures the length of path between two given individuals in a network and is a feature of the theoretical model that has not been tested empirically.

The key findings are summarized in Figure 1. We find that network degree strongly and robustly positively correlates with network centrality; it also robustly correlates positively with bridging social capital. In simple Pearson correlations, network degree also correlates negatively with bonding social capital whereas network centrality correlates positively with bridging and negatively with bonding social capital. Bridging and bonding social capital are, in turn, essentially uncorrelated in our data. All these relationships will be well approximated by our computational multi-agent model, both qualitatively and quantitatively, even though we do not calibrate any of the model parameters to match these correlations directly (see Table 2 in Section 4 on simulation design).

The empirical study of [Growiec, Growiec, and Kamiński \(2017\)](#) also confirms a robust positive link between bridging social capital (social ties with dissimilar others) and willingness to cooperate, and between social trust and willingness to cooperate, as well as points at a negative relationship between bonding social capital (strong kinship ties) and social trust. These findings are in line with bulk of the associated literature and

will be accordingly reflected in the assumptions of our model.

3 Model Description

3.1 Network Structure

We consider a population of N agents who are connected. The connections between agents $i, j \in \{1, 2, \dots, N\}$ is interpreted as *social ties*, defined following Bourdieu (1986). Let $x_{i,j}$ denote if there is a connection between agents ($x_{i,j} = 1$) or not ($x_{i,j} = 0$). We assume that social ties are symmetric, i.e., $x_{i,j} = x_{j,i}$. For the sake of completeness of the definition we take that $x_{i,i} = 0$.

We model the graph of connections between agents using Watts and Strogatz (1998) algorithm. It has three parameters: N denoting the number of agents in the model, r denoting the graph radius (so that $2r$ is the average node degree in the social graph, i.e., the average number of social ties per agent), and p denoting the edge rewiring probability.

In short, the Watts-Strogatz algorithm works as follows. Agents are located one after the other on a circle (so that agent 1 is adjacent to agents 2 and N). Initially each agent i is connected to agents $\{j : 0 < \min\{|i - j|, n - |i - j|\} \leq r\}$, i.e., to her $2r$ closest neighbors along the circle. Next, with probability p each existing link is replaced by a random link. Hence, the resulting graph is always between a lattice ($p = 0$) and a random network ($p = 1$). For moderate values of p we obtain *small world* networks.

In what follows, by D_i we denote the degree of agent i in the graph and by C_i her eigenvector centrality, cf. Bonacich (1972). Furthermore, by $L_{i,j}$ we denote the length of the shortest path between agents i and j along the network graph. We impose $L_{i,j} = N$ if such a path does not exist.

3.2 Bonding and Bridging Social Capital

We assume that every agent $i \in \{1, 2, \dots, N\}$ has two independent traits: family location f_i and agent type v_i .

Family location of agent i is denoted as $f_i \in [0, 1]$ and interpreted such that for any two agents i and j , the smaller the difference between f_i and f_j , the closer are the family

ties between them. To treat every value of f_i in the same way, we assume that the values are positioned on a circle; therefore we assume that values 0 and 1 are identical. Accordingly, we define family similarity s_f between agents i and j as

$$s_f(i, j) = (1 - \min\{|f_i - f_j|, 1 - |f_i - f_j|\}).$$

Observe that $s_f(i, j) \in [0, 0.5]$. Using the notion of family similarity we define *bonding social capital* of agent i as

$$Bo_i = \begin{cases} \sum_{\{j \in \{1, \dots, N\}: x_{i,j}=1\}} \frac{s_f(i,j)}{D_i} & \text{if } D_i > 0 \\ 0 & \text{if } D_i = 0 \end{cases}.$$

Hence, bonding social capital of agent i represents the average level of family similarity across all agent i 's social ties. This definition agrees with the view that bonding social capital refers to forming social ties within relatively impermeable confines (Putnam, 2000) which may be narrowed down to kinship ties (Alesina and Giuliano, 2010; Growiec, 2015), in line with the presumption that “kin ties are a conservative measure of strong ties” (Tian and Lin, 2016, p. 123).

Agent type is denoted as $v_i \in \mathbb{R}$ and interpreted as a unidimensional representation of the agent's individual characteristics such as age, gender, interests, skills, etc. Values of v_i are assumed to be normally distributed in the population, $v_i \sim \mathcal{N}(0, 1)$. Hence, agents can be more or less *typical* in terms of their type v_i : values close to 0 are considered typical whereas extreme values that are very positive or very negative are non-typical. For any two agents i and j , the smaller the difference between v_i and v_j , the more similar are their characteristics.

We assume that social ties between dissimilar others (i.e., agents of very different types) are relatively advantageous in terms of transmitting information and other network resources (Burt, 2005; Granovetter, 2005). Hence, although we do not impose any valuation of types, we implicitly assume that less typical agents (far from 0) offer potentially more unique values to their connections so they would tend to be more central in the network. We define type distance d_v between agents i and j as

$$d_v(i, j) = 1 - \exp(-|v_i - v_j|),$$

so that $d_v \in [0, 1)$. Consequently, based on the concept of type similarity we define *bridging social capital* of agent i as

$$Br_i = \begin{cases} \frac{\sum_{\{j \in \{1, \dots, N\}: x_{i,j}=1\}} d_v(i,j)}{D_i} & \text{if } D_i > 0 \\ 0 & \text{if } D_i = 0 \end{cases}.$$

Hence, bridging social capital of agent i represents the average level of type distance (trait heterogeneity) across all agent i 's social ties. This definition agrees with the view that bridging social capital refers to forming social ties across social cleavages and requires people to transcend their simple social identity (Putnam, 2000; Leonard, 2008).

3.3 Relationships Among the Four Dimensions of Social Capital

An important challenge to our modeling approach is to assign values of f_i and v_i to agents in a way that would both reflect the underlying micro-level theory (see the overview in Section 2) and empirical observations (Growiec, Growiec, and Kamiński, 2017), and allow us to test the aggregate implications of the model for different setups of the social network structure. In particular we would like our model to satisfy the following postulates:

- (P1) there should be a strong positive correlation between agent centrality and degree;
- (P2) the framework should allow us to simulate the entire spectrum of societies ranging from strongly family-oriented ones (where almost all social ties are between family members) to societies where social ties are uncorrelated with family location;
- (P3) bonding social capital should be negatively correlated with agent centrality and degree;
- (P4) bridging social capital should be strongly positively correlated with agent centrality and degree;
- (P5) bridging social capital should be essentially uncorrelated (or, if anything, slightly negatively correlated) with bonding social capital.

The choice of Watts and Strogatz (1998) algorithm for generating the social network directly results from property (P1) and allows us to have property (P2) as long as there is a relationship between f_i and the agent index i . Therefore we take the following approach

to calculating f_i . First we define $\tilde{f}_i = i/N + z_i$, where z_i has a uniform distribution over the interval $[-\lambda, \lambda]$, where $\lambda \in [0, 0.5]$. Next we compute each agent’s family location as $f_i = \tilde{f}_i - \lfloor \tilde{f}_i \rfloor$. In this way f_i is uniformly distributed over the interval $[0, 1]$ while λ governs the strength of relationship between each agent’s family location f_i and her location in the social network. For $\lambda = 0$ we have a strong association between f_i and the agent’s position in the graph. For $\lambda = 0.5$ there is no association between them.

An additional insight follows from considering the parameter λ jointly with the *edge rewiring* probability p , which also governs the probability of occurrence of local cliques in the network. Namely, for low values of p , the network is fragmented into a number of local cliques (such that there are many links within each cluster but very few links between the clusters). In such a situation, the parameter λ governs the share of local cliques that are family based: for $\lambda = 0$, they are predominantly family based, whereas for $\lambda = 0.5$ they are not family based at all. In sum, the consequences of setting low and high values of λ and p are the following:

- low λ , low p : highly clustered social ties primarily among family members;
- high λ , low p : highly clustered social ties with arbitrary agents;
- high p (λ not important): random social ties with arbitrary agents.

Observe that the above assumptions also lead to property (P3). Agents who have higher centrality C_i have more *rewired* links, and thus tend to have, on average, a lower fraction of social ties within family. Those different types of communities are described for example by [Woolcock \(1998\)](#); [Halpern \(2005\)](#); [Rothstein \(2011\)](#).

In order to ensure property (P4) – a positive correlation between bridging social capital and agent’s centrality and degree – we assume that people who have a more unique type (v_i further away from 0) are also more central to the network (a higher C_i). This assumption is in line with claims made in numerous sociological studies (e.g., [Burt, 1992, 2005, 2010](#); [Granovetter, 2005](#); [Kadushin, 2002, 2012](#)) and reflects the finding that social ties between dissimilar others tend to be relatively advantageous in terms of transmitting information and other network resources.

Formally, we assign v_i to agents according to the following procedure:

1. For each agent i , we calculate her rank q_i with respect to her eigenvector centrality.

We assume that the agent with lowest C_i has $q_i = 1$ whereas the agent with highest

C_j has $q_j = N$. In the case a few agents have the same eigenvector centrality coefficient, they are ranked randomly.

2. We generate N draws from a normal distribution, $u_i \sim \mathcal{N}(0, \sigma^2)$, where $\sigma^2 \in (0, 1)$, and sort them in order of increasing absolute value; by \tilde{u}_i we denote this sorted sequence (i.e. $|\tilde{u}_i| \leq |\tilde{u}_{i+1}|$).
3. We set $v_i = \tilde{u}_{q_i} + w_i$, where $w_i \sim \mathcal{N}(0, 1 - \sigma^2)$.

Observe that under this procedure, unconditionally $v_i \sim \mathcal{N}(0, 1)$. Agent types v_i are however correlated with their network centrality C_i . Agents with a low C_i will tend to have their v_i close to 0 and the ones with high C_i will tend to have v_i far from 0. The parameter σ^2 captures the strength of association between v_i and C_i : if $\sigma^2 = 1$ then the relationship is perfect, and if $\sigma^2 = 0$ then there is no relationship.

Given that, by definition, agents who are non-typical in terms of their type v_i tend to have more bridging social capital, the proposed procedure of generation of v_i ensures that bridging social capital will be positively correlated with C_i in the population, thus ensuring that the property (P4) holds.

Finally, property (P5) follows from the fact that family location f_i and agent type v_i are modeled as independent agent characteristics. Hence, there is no direct link between bonding and bridging social capital. Slight negative correlation will be observed, however, because of the bilateral links between both variables and network centrality, one of which is negative and the other – positive.

3.4 Social Utility

We assume that the overall well-being of the agents has two components: social utility and economic performance.

Social utility SU_i of an agent is interpreted as all non-economic resources drawn from her social contacts. Following the literature ([Alesina and Giuliano, 2010](#); [Roberts and Dunbar, 2011](#); [Curry and Dunbar, 2013a,b](#)) we assume that if agent i has a social tie with agent j , her social utility from this contact is increased if they have strong family ties (there is high family similarity $s_f(i, j)$) as well as if agent j has many valuable contacts (j has a high centrality coefficient C_j in terms of our model). This reflects the two diverse purposes social ties may serve ([Kadushin, 2002](#)): the need for affiliation

and emotional closeness (addressed by strong kinship ties) and the need for personal development and success (addressed by the informational advantages of social ties with agents who are central to the network). We assume that the relationship between these two sources of social utility follows a Cobb–Douglas utility function.

Because for different graphs, the shape of the distribution of eigenvector centrality C_i is not constant, we introduce Q_i corresponding to the rank of C_i divided by the total number of agents. If two or more agents have the same C_i , we average their ranks. Formally, let F_{emp} be empirical cumulative distribution function of C_i . Then $Q_i \in [0, 1]$ is defined as:

$$Q_i = \frac{\lim_{x \rightarrow C_i^-} F_{\text{emp}}(x) + \lim_{x \rightarrow C_i^+} F_{\text{emp}}(x)}{2}.$$

Under this definition Q_i is defined over the interval $[0, 1]$ and its mean is always equal to 0.5, independent of graph structure.

We are now in a position to define *social utility* of agent i as:

$$SU_i = \begin{cases} \sum_{\{j \in \{1, \dots, N\}: x_{i,j}=1\}} \frac{s_f(i,j)^\rho Q_j^{1-\rho}}{D_i} & \text{if } D_i > 0 \\ 0 & \text{if } D_i = 0 \end{cases},$$

where $\rho \in [0, 1]$ captures the prevailing social norm on family importance. In societies with a high ρ , family is perceived as relatively important for social utility when compared to social ties outside of family, and affiliation is perceived as relatively important when compared to personal development. The opposite is true for societies with a low ρ .

3.5 Social Trust, Willingness to Cooperate and Economic Performance

Economic performance EU_i of agents is modeled with a “prisoner’s dilemma” game played in the social network. Agents are matched in pairs and engage in economic interaction. The matching is random but the probability of a match depends on the degree of mutual trust between the two agents, implying that agents who are generally more trustful are also relatively more likely to engage in economic interaction. Once agents i and j are matched then they act in two steps: first they announce if they want to cooperate or defect and next they actually play the game, which allows them to randomly deviate from their original choice.

Following the findings from the empirical literature (Dasgupta, 1988; Burt, 2005, 2010; Growiec, Growiec, and Kamiński, 2017) we assume that mutual trust between two agents is negatively related to their distance in the social network ($L_{i,j}$) as well as to the stocks of bonding social capital each of them holds (Bo_i, Bo_j). We model the links between these sources of mutual trust with a Cobb–Douglas function and assume symmetry between the two agents. Hence, we formally assume that the probability $P_{i,j}$ that agents i and j are randomly matched follows:

$$P_{i,j} = \frac{\sqrt{(1 - Bo_i)(1 - Bo_j)}}{L_{i,j}}.$$

This formulation allows us to posit a model-based definition of *social trust* of agent i , being the average level of mutual trust she holds towards everyone else in the population:

$$Tr_i = \sum_{i \neq j} \frac{P_{i,j}}{N - 1}.$$

Hence, social trust is expected to be negatively related to agents’ bonding social capital (see Figure 1) and (indirectly) positively related to their network degree and centrality.

If agents i and j are matched, they engage in economic interaction, modeled as a “prisoner’s dilemma” game. The outcome of the interaction depends on their decisions to cooperate or defect. We assume that if i and j cooperate then they both get a high positive outcome (“reward”), if they both defect then they get a low positive outcome (“punishment”), and if agent i cooperates while agent j defects, then agent i gets a negative outcome whereas agent j gets a very high “temptation” outcome. We assume that this game is symmetric for both agents. It is also implicit that under such parametrization, economic interaction is socially desirable even if both agents defect: the sum of “punishment” outcomes is positive. From an agent’s perspective, however, it is still better not to interact at all and get a zero payoff than to cooperate, be cheated and get a negative payoff. This underscores the role that social trust plays in our setup: it is the confidence that one will not be cheated if engaged in an economic interaction.

We also assume that the expected payoff from an economic interaction increases with the type difference between the agents, $d_v(i, j)$, reflecting the fact that social ties between dissimilar others tend to be relatively more beneficial for the flow of information and other network resources (Granovetter, 2005).

Given all these assumptions, and normalizing the “reward” outcome to unity, we obtain the following payoff matrix of our “prisoner’s dilemma” game (payoffs are given for agent i):

$$G_{i,j} = d_v(i,j) \begin{bmatrix} 1 & g_{cn} \\ g_{nc} & g_{nn} \end{bmatrix},$$

where the values are ordered according to $g_{nc} > 1 > g_{nn} > 0 > g_{cn}$.

Instead of allowing the agents to pick their optimal strategy in a dynamic game, which would (amongst other problems) involve the calculation of the probability of being matched to the same agent repeatedly in the future, we simplify the analysis by assuming that agents’ choices are random. Following the associated literature ([Granovetter, 2005](#); [Field, 2010](#); [Growiec, Growiec, and Kamiński, 2017](#)) we assume that the probability that agent i will choose to cooperate with agent j is negatively related to their distance in the social network ($L_{i,j}$) and positively related to the decision maker’s bridging social capital (Br_i),

$$W_{i,j} = \frac{Br_i}{L_{i,j}}.$$

Additionally, for each agent i we also define her overall *willingness to cooperate* as the average probability of cooperation with anyone else in the population,

$$Co_i = \sum_{i \neq j} \frac{W_{i,j}}{N-1}.$$

Hence, willingness to cooperate is expected to be positively related to agents’ bridging social capital (see [Figure 1](#)) and (indirectly) positively related to their network degree and centrality.

We assume that in the first stage of the game, agents make their claims to cooperate or defect independently. There are two possibilities. First, one or both of them may refuse to cooperate. In such a case, both agents will play the individually rational “defect” strategy. This happens with the probability $1 - W_{i,j}W_{j,i}$. Second, both of them may agree to cooperate. This happens with probability $W_{i,j}W_{j,i}$. In such a case, however, the agents enter the second stage of the game where they are allowed to independently keep their promise, with probability ε , or otherwise break it. In summary, we obtain the

following matrix of probabilities of decisions of agents i and j :

$$D_{i,j} = \begin{bmatrix} \varepsilon^2 W_{i,j} W_{j,i} & \varepsilon(1 - \varepsilon) W_{i,j} W_{j,i} \\ \varepsilon(1 - \varepsilon) W_{i,j} W_{j,i} & 1 - \varepsilon(2 - \varepsilon) W_{i,j} W_{j,i} \end{bmatrix},$$

which incorporates the fact that the “defect–defect” outcome may happen either when at least one of the agents refuses to cooperate in the first stage of the game ($1 - W_{i,j} W_{j,i}$), or when both of them break their promise to cooperate in the second stage ($(1 - \varepsilon)^2 W_{i,j} W_{j,i}$).

On the basis of the above discussion, *economic performance* of agent i is defined as her expected aggregate payoff from economic interactions with all other agents:

$$EU_i = \sum_{j \neq i} P_{i,j} d_v(i, j) (W_{i,j} W_{j,i} (\varepsilon^2 + \varepsilon(1 - \varepsilon)(g_{cn} + g_{nc}) - \varepsilon(2 - \varepsilon)g_{nn}) + g_{nn}).$$

Hence, economic performance depends directly: positively on social trust, willingness to cooperate and bridging social capital, and indirectly: negatively on bonding social capital (via social trust) and positively on bridging social capital (via willingness to cooperate) as well as network degree and centrality (via both social trust and willingness to cooperate).

4 Simulation Analysis of Model Properties

The simulation model was executed 65536 times for the parameterization range given in Table 1. The experiment design was generated using a Sobol sequence with Owen+Faure-Tezuka scrambling (Hong and Hickernell, 2003).

An advantage of our modeling approach is that the computational model is able to match (at least qualitatively) the key features of our individual-level data (Growiec, Growiec, and Kamiński, 2017) even when no variables are specifically targeted in any calibration procedure. For example, Table 2 demonstrates that the cross-sectional correlations among the four considered social capital dimensions as generated from our model under two different parameterizations remain in the ballpark of our empirical results.

The results reported in the following sections capture the impact of changes in specific model parameters on two types of outcomes: (i) aggregate variables (e.g., average social utility or economic performance in the entire society), and (ii) individual-level

Table 1: Parametrization of the simulation experiment

Parameter	Values	Interpretation
N	2048	number of agents in the model
r	$\{1, \dots, 15\}$	$2r$ is average number of social ties per agent
p	$[0, 1]$	(inverted) probability of occurrence of local cliques
λ	$[0, 0.5]$	(inverted) share of local cliques that are family based
σ^2	$[0, 1]$	the degree to which value of information is an important factor in the creation of social ties in the network (correlation between $ v_i $ and C_i)
ρ	$[0, 1]$	relative importance of family ties for social utility
g_{nc}	$[1.25, 2]$	“temptation” payoff
g_{cn}	$[-0.5, 0]$	“sucker’s” payoff
g_{nn}	$[0.25, 0.75]$	“punishment” payoff
ε	$[0.5, 1]$	probability that an agent keeps the promise to cooperate

correlations (e.g., the cross-sectional correlation between the agents’ network centrality and willingness to cooperate). In each case, we report the expected value of the outcome variable Y based on its marginal distribution with respect to a certain parameter θ in question – i.e., the expected value of Y conditional on θ while allowing the other parameters (collected in the vector $\omega \in \Omega$) to follow their distributions F , as in $\theta \mapsto E(Y|\theta) = \int_{\Omega} Y(\theta, \omega) dF(\omega)$. For instance, the impact of network density r on aggregate social utility in the society is reported as values of the mapping $r \mapsto E(\langle SU \rangle | r)$.¹ Thus we maintain the *ceteris paribus* assumption required in comparative statics studies while refraining from specifying a unique baseline model calibration. We also note that the influence of model parameters on simulation output variables is sometimes non-linear and its sign may depend on the value of other model parameters; therefore in the text we comment only on the most significant and robust relationships.

Following the standard requirements for computational research (Peng, 2011), in order to ensure reproducibility of the results all the source code and data used to generate the presented results is available for download at <http://bogumilkaminski.pl/projects/>. In particular the simulation results discussed in this paper present only selected, relatively more important relationships present in the data. The whole simulation results file contains 65536 observations, where each single observation consists of 10 parameter

¹Wherever we find important interactions between parameters, we also report expected values conditioned on the confounding parameter. For example, we report the impact of p on aggregate social utility SU conditional on λ as $p \mapsto E(\langle SU \rangle | p; \lambda)$.

Table 2: Overview of correlations: data vs. model

	Degree	Centrality	Bridging	Bonding
Data: simple correlation				
Degree	1			
Centrality	0.839***	1		
Bridging	0.210***	0.210***	1	
Bonding	-0.107***	-0.104***	-0.044	1
Data: Partial correlation with controls				
Degree	1			
Centrality	0.759***	1		
Bridging	0.115***	0.040	1	
Bonding	0.005	-0.045	0.007	1
Model (with $p = 0.1, \rho = 0.5$)				
Degree	1			
Centrality	0.863	1		
Bridging	0.165	0.246	1	
Bonding	-0.159	-0.133	-0.052	1
Model (with $p = 0.2, \rho = 0.75$)				
Degree	1			
Centrality	0.929	1		
Bridging	0.145	0.200	1	
Bonding	-0.142	-0.133	-0.008	1

Controls: sociability (2 variables), gender, age, age squared, choice and control, widowed, size of town of residence, education, cooperation, trust, trust inside the network.

Note: *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

combinations and 67 simulation output variables.

5 Results for Aggregate Variables

As we are primarily interested in assessing the impact of *social network structure* on a range of socio-economic outcomes, the key model parameters which are considered here are r – network density, p – the (inverted) probability of occurrence of local cliques, and λ – the (inverted) share of local cliques that are family based. We also comment on the role of the family importance parameter ρ .

Social capital, trust and cooperation. The first set of results describes the impact of social network structure on the aggregate stocks of bridging and bonding social capital

as well as average levels of social trust and willingness to cooperate in the society. The results are summarized in Table 3 and should be interpreted as follows: if we pick any parameterization of the model and change only one parameter (in rows), keeping other parameters unchanged, the table provides the direction of change of the given output variable (in columns).

Table 3: Relationship between model parameters and average bonding social capital, bridging social capital, social trust and willingness to cooperate

	<i>Bo</i>	<i>Br</i>	<i>Tr</i>	<i>Co</i>
Network density r	positive	positive	positive	positive
Rewire probability p	negative	positive	positive	positive
Non-family-based cliques λ	negative	unrelated	positive	unrelated

While internationally comparable data on social network structure – as summarized by r, p and λ in our model – do not exist (to our knowledge), it is reassuring to observe that the signs of all our results are well aligned with the associated theoretical literature. First, we find that more dense networks (higher r) exhibit higher bridging and bonding social capital, higher trust and cooperativeness. This reflects the basic observation that when the individuals are more connected, all kinds of network resources become easier to obtain (Bourdieu, 1986).

Second, we observe that bridging social capital, social trust and willingness to cooperate are relatively higher in societies whose social networks are relatively more random, i.e., if there is a relatively low probability of occurrence of local cliques (high p). This aligns well with Burt’s (1992; 2005; 2010) argument on the importance of “structural holes”, network bridges and ties with dissimilar others for social trust and cooperation, and with Granovetter’s (1973; 2005) observations on the crucial role of diverse social networks in building social trust.

Finally, we also find that aggregate bonding social capital increases with the frequency of local cliques in the network (decreases with p) as well as with the share of local cliques that are family based (decreases with λ). The frequency of family based cliques also exerts a negative influence on social trust. All of this precisely mirrors Putnam’s findings for Italy (Putnam, Leonardi, and Nanetti, 1993) and the US (Putnam, 2000).

Social utility and economic performance. The next two outcome variables which


we consider are the average levels of social utility and economic performance in the society. The impacts of r , p , λ and ρ (the importance of family ties for social utility) on these aggregate outcomes are depicted in Figures 2 and 3. Both figures show one-way non-parametric regressions between the given model parameter and mean EU and SU respectively. This means that the effect of all other parameters on the presented results is averaged out. However, we have also analyzed all other relationships between model parameters and simulation outputs, including the possible interactions between parameters; here we report only the relationships which are of significant strength and are relevant to our study objective. The impact of social network structure on economic performance is discussed first because, despite its relatively more involved definition in the model setup, the results for this variable are more straightforward to interpret.

Figure 2 demonstrates that average economic performance grows with r , p and λ . We find that, other things equal, societies that either are globally better connected, exhibit a lower frequency of local cliques, or have a smaller share of family-based cliques, are relatively more efficient in terms of aggregate economic performance. These broadly positive effects of dense, diverse and inclusive networks are in line with the theoretical arguments put forward by, among others, Putnam (2000); Lin (2001); Burt (2005) as well as with the partial empirical results due to, e.g., Knack and Keefer (1997); Inglehart and Baker (2000); Beugelsdijk and Smulders (2003). Other partial confirmation of our results can be found by looking at country averages from ESS data (see Appendix A): the average frequency of social contacts goes together with social trust (0.48***) and income (0.49***). Social trust is also very tightly directly linked to the country’s economic performance (0.80***).

Hence, our model delivers an empirically testable hypothesis that societies which form dense (r), inclusive (p) and diverse (λ) networks should be more trustful and more willing to cooperate, and thus exhibit better economic performance, than societies which are permeated by visible and invisible barriers, fragmenting the networks into locally dense cliques of individuals who think alike and have similar sets of information and other resources. Unfortunately, sufficiently detailed and internationally comparable data on social network structures are not yet available.

Figure 3 presents the outcomes for social utility. Here we make three main findings. First, we observe that average social utility presents a \cap -shaped relationship with

Figure 2: The impact of network density (r), probability of local cliques (p), and the share of local cliques that are family-based (λ), on average economic performance in the society (EU)



network density r , with a peak at $r^* = 3$ which corresponds to an average of 6 social ties person. This finding relates to Dunbar’s (1992; 1993) observation that individuals’ social networks tend to form “a series of concentric (and egocentric) circles of acquaintanceship containing, roughly, 5, 15, 50, 150, 500 and 1500 individuals, with their circles reflecting successively declining emotional closeness and frequency of contact.” (Stiller and Dunbar, 2007, p. 94). The circle of approximately 5 people is the “support clique” in which the individual seeks support in her everyday life.² Hence, our model extends these findings by predicting that in societies where people’s social ties tend to be limited to their narrow “support cliques”, the average social component of individuals’ well-being is maximized. In contrast, as shown above, the average economic component of well-being (i.e., the aggregate economic performance) increases with r also when $r > 3$. This creates a tension between aggregate social utility and economic performance.

Second, we find that average social utility increases with the share of local cliques that are family based (i.e., decreases with λ). This reflects the observation that greater family similarity makes social ties more efficient in satisfying the “safety drive” (Bowlby, 1969; Kadushin, 2002) and thus it is often the family to which we turn for support. However, a high frequency of kinship ties also comes in the way of the “effectiveness drive” because kinship ties are not particularly efficient in facilitating the flow of information and other network resources and often are found to reduce individuals’ earnings (Franzen and Hangartner, 2006; Sabatini, 2009). This further strengthens the tension between aggregate social utility and economic performance.

Third, we find that average social utility has a mixed reaction to p (the probability

²Individual differences imply that the size of the support clique actually varies between 4 and 7.


of occurrence of local cliques), depending on ρ (the importance of family ties for social utility) and λ (the share of local cliques that are family based): (i) if ρ is small or λ is large then average social utility is relatively low and increases with p ; (ii) conversely, if ρ is large or λ is small then social utility is relatively high and decreases with p . The former case describes societies where family ties are not particularly valued or where local cliques are diverse and not limited to family members (such as, e.g., the societies of Nordic countries, cf. [Alesina and Giuliano \(2010\)](#)). In that case, the social benefits from having access to more information outweigh the costs of obtaining less family support and the society is better off with inclusive networks (high p) rather than with a multitude of local cliques. The latter case, in contrast, describes societies where family ties are valued highly or where local cliques tend to be limited to family members (such as, e.g., the societies of Mediterranean countries). In that case, the social benefits from obtaining more family support outweigh the costs of having worse access to information and the society is relatively better off with fragmented networks with many local cliques (low p).

As a side remark, we also note that in our model, average social utility increases with the relative importance of family ties vs. contacts with “valuable”, centrally located people (ρ). Values of other aggregate model variables are not affected by ρ . The role of the “prisoner’s dilemma” parameters g_{nn} , g_{nc} , g_{cn} and ε is similarly unidimensional: they have a one-way influence only on economic performance (i.e., higher payoffs and a lower promise default rate lead to higher average economic performance).

Implications for network structure. Our results imply that there exists a clear trade-off between social utility and economic performance at the aggregate level, and both of them cannot be maximized at the same time. However, assuming a social welfare function which puts positive weights on both objectives, we can draw the following implications from the above results.

1. *Network density.* In real societies, average network density is never extremely low. For example, in our data for the Polish society ([Growiec, Growiec, and Kamiński, 2017](#)), respondents declare to have contacted, on average, 10.4 persons during the last week and 17.3 persons during the last month. Therefore we can safely discard the range of $r \leq 3$ in which both social utility and economic performance grow with r . For $r > 3$, however, there is a trade-off between both objectives. In consequence we expect that, even though in our model we do not directly take into account the

Figure 3: The impact of network density (r), share of local cliques (λ), and probability of occurrence of local cliques (p) on average social utility (SU)



costs of forming and maintaining social links, the optimal density of the network is bounded.

2. *Frequency of family-based local cliques.* Similarly, we expect that it is optimal for a society to keep a balance between cliques of friends consisting of family members and other acquaintances: λ has a different direction of influence on aggregate social utility and economic performance.
3. *Frequency of local cliques.* Finally, when we consider the frequency of local cliques in the network (parameter p), the situation depends on how much family ties are valued in the society. If contacts with the family are highly valued (or if local cliques are predominantly family based) then there is a trade-off between aggregate economic performance and social utility and we can expect that *small world* networks (moderate p) are optimal; however, if family ties are not highly praised in the community (or if local cliques are very diverse) then it is optimal for a society to form highly diversified, inclusive network structures (high p).

6 Results for Individual-Level Correlations

The second group of simulation results quantifies the impact of social network structure on individual-level correlations. In this way we address the micro–macro linkages, i.e., we investigate the degree to which individual-level incentives are affected by country-level averages. These findings are helpful for understanding which correlations are robust and expected to hold in all societies, and which are specific to a given network structure.

The results are presented in Table 4 and can be summarized in the eight points provided below. We note that the first three of them are supported by ESS data (see Appendix B), whereas empirical verification of the latter five ones is not possible on the basis of cross-country panel survey datasets so far due to the lack of information on the key variables in question.

1. *In dense networks, social ties are individually less valuable.* ESS data strongly suggest that in countries where social contacts are relatively frequent on average, individuals' social ties are less correlated with incomes (-0.3960^{***}), social utility (-0.6340^{***}), and overall life satisfaction (-0.5310^{***}). They are also less tightly

Table 4: The impact of model parameters on individual-level correlations

Correlation between	Average correlation			Impact of parameter			
	PL Data	ESS	Model	r	p	λ	ρ
D_i and C_i	0.8387*		0.8661 [†]	0.5146	0.3656	0.0000	0.0002
D_i and Bo_i	-0.0986*		-0.0138 [†]	-0.4164	0.3875	0.3017	-0.0006
D_i and Br_i	0.2100*		0.2248 [†]	0.0493	0.1299	-0.0002	0.0002
D_i and SU_i	0.1540*	0.2095	0.1934	-0.6019	0.1754	0.0872	0.0002
D_i and Tr_i	0.0578	0.4795*	0.3655	-0.4470	0.5631	-0.1756	0.0008
D_i and Co_i	0.0387		0.3449	-0.1004	0.2379	-0.0001	0.0003
D_i and EU_i	0.0360	0.4855*	0.4026	-0.1806	0.1826	-0.0718	0.0004
C_i and Bo_i	-0.1325*		-0.0327 [†]	-0.2760	0.4924	0.4592	0.0000
C_i and Br_i	0.2100*		0.2599 [†]	0.1022	-0.0222	-0.0001	0.0001
C_i and SU_i	0.1119*		0.4132	-0.2489	-0.3691	0.0379	-0.5221
C_i and Tr_i	0.0385		0.3416	-0.1050	0.6834	-0.1298	0.0012
C_i and Co_i	0.0460		0.3782	-0.0261	0.0868	0.0001	0.0003
C_i and EU_i	0.0333		0.4078	-0.0745	0.1218	-0.0383	0.0004
Bo_i and Br_i	-0.0898*		0.0339 [†]	-0.5023	0.2156	0.0685	-0.0007
Bo_i and SU_i	0.0164		0.3573	-0.1490	0.2239	0.0612	0.8555
Bo_i and Tr_i	-0.0373		-0.8194	-0.5774	0.2080	0.0414	0.0003
Bo_i and Co_i	-0.0080		0.0154	-0.4635	0.3125	0.1591	-0.001
Bo_i and EU_i	-0.1207*		-0.3806	-0.1239	0.4727	0.2456	-0.0003
Br_i and SU_i	0.0693		0.1918	-0.3102	-0.0531	0.0065	-0.1712
Br_i and Tr_i	-0.0360		0.1141	-0.3580	0.2240	-0.0146	0.0009
Br_i and Co_i	0.1196*		0.9752	0.5225	0.0520	0.0011	-0.0014
Br_i and EU_i	0.1350*		0.7056	0.8706	0.2259	0.1557	0.0000
SU_i and Tr_i	0.0402	0.5585*	-0.1171	-0.4127	0.0078	-0.0075	-0.7273
SU_i and Co_i	0.2163*		0.2394	-0.4723	-0.0415	0.0170	-0.2483
SU_i and EU_i	0.0000	0.5551*	0.0685	-0.3621	0.0069	0.0483	-0.6104
Tr_i and Co_i	0.2653*		0.1876	-0.5442	0.1221	-0.0356	0.0014
Tr_i and EU_i	0.2972*	0.8009*	0.5799	-0.7808	-0.2019	-0.2291	0.0007
Co_i and EU_i	0.1912*		0.7592	0.8046	0.2630	0.1761	0.0007

Notes: (i) $*p < 0.01$; [†]correlation used for model construction; (ii) in our Polish data, SU is computed as residuals from regressing life satisfaction (a combination of SU and EU) on relative incomes (EU). Zero correlation between EU and SU follows by construction; (iii) in ESS data, SU is computed as residuals from regressing life satisfaction ($stflife$) on income deciles ($hinctnt$) within a given country and year. There is zero correlation at the individual level within each country-year cell but not across cells.

linked to social trust (-0.4135^{***}). In these countries, social trust is also visibly less correlated with incomes (-0.2909^{***}).

Our model reproduces all these findings qualitatively and also provides a few more detailed predictions. We find that an increase in r , mapping to the average number of social ties per agent, reduces the individual-level correlation of:

- Agent degree D_i versus social trust, willingness to cooperate, social utility and economic performance.
 - Bonding social capital Bo_i versus social trust, willingness to cooperate, social utility and economic performance.
 - Agent centrality C_i versus social utility and trust.
 - Bridging social capital Br_i and social trust.
 - Social trust and economic performance.
2. *Social trust is a functional substitute to social networks.* In trustful societies, social ties are individually less valuable, whereas in dense networks, the same follows for social trust. This pattern is clear in ESS data: in countries with a high average level of social trust, the frequency of social contacts is less correlated with individuals' incomes (-0.5406^{***}), social utility (-0.4173^{***}), and overall life satisfaction (-0.4339^{***}). By the same token, in distrustful societies, individuals' social ties are relatively more important for generating social utility and economic performance.

Our model correctly represents these relationships qualitatively. However, unlike network density r , aggregate social trust Tr is endogenously determined within the model, which allows us to provide a number of more detailed predictions. Having observed that aggregate social trust is positively related to both network density r and the (inverted) probability of occurrence of local cliques, p , we investigate the relationships between aggregate social trust and individual-level correlations by looking at the respective impacts of r and p . The key comparative statics for both parameters, however, are opposite in sign. This indicates the relatively dominant role of variation in r as well as underscores that both parameters influence social trust through different channels.

We find that an increase in p , i.e., a reduction in the frequency of local cliques, raises social trust but *increases* the individual-level correlation of:

- Agent degree D_i versus social trust, willingness to cooperate, social utility and economic performance.
 - Bonding social capital Bo_i versus social trust, willingness to cooperate, social utility and economic performance.
 - Agent centrality C_i versus social trust and economic performance.
 - Bridging social capital Br_i versus social trust and economic performance.
3. *In dense networks and trustful societies, there is a trade-off between individuals' social utility and economic performance, and conversely, in sparse networks and distrustful societies, social utility and economic performance are positively correlated in the cross section. Looking at ESS data, we find that individual life satisfaction is less dependent on incomes if the society supports frequent social contacts (-0.3097^{***}) or is generally trustful (-0.4540^{***}).*

Our model reproduces this finding. We find that (i) on average, looking across all the considered model parameterizations, social utility and economic performance are essentially uncorrelated, but (ii) an increase in network density r unambiguously reduces the individual-level correlation between social utility and economic performance. Hence, in line with the empirical regularities we find that for low r (sparse networks),³ social utility and economic performance go hand in hand while for high r (dense networks), they present a trade-off.

Additional simulation results regarding the trade-off between SU_i and EU_i are included in Appendix C.

4. *In dense networks, there is a clearer trade-off between bonding social capital and other forms of social capital.* The model implies that an increase in r , mapping to the average number of social ties per agent, systematically reduces the individual-level correlation of bonding social capital Bo_i versus network degree, centrality, and bridging social capital. The more social ties people have on average, the less

³Recall however that r is also strongly positively related to social trust (as well as bridging social capital and willingness to cooperate).

of a difference there is between the ones who contact primarily with kin and the ones who have a more diversified network structure.

5. *In dense networks, bridging social capital is more conducive to cooperation and economic performance.* An increase in r strongly increases the individual-level correlation of bridging social capital Br_i versus willingness to cooperate Co_i and economic performance EU_i , as well as between Co_i and EU_i themselves. Social ties with dissimilar others and cooperative behaviors are individually profitable only if there is a sufficiently high chance that a random stranger will also play cooperatively.
6. *In societies with more local cliques (low p), individuals' economic performance is less tightly linked to their bridging social capital and cooperation, but more strongly linked to social trust and more strongly negatively linked to bonding social capital.* In societies where local cliques are frequent, social ties with dissimilar others and cooperative behaviors provide relatively less individual profit; on the other hand, engaging in economic interaction is relatively more profitable because there is quite a large chance of interacting with agents who are distant in one's network (high $L_{i,j}$).
7. *In societies where local cliques are predominantly family-based (low λ), the role of individuals' bonding social capital is relatively small.* In societies where local cliques are frequent (low p), they may provide economic advantages to their members. In such a case, individuals whose social ties are mostly limited to kin will likely not belong to such cliques unless they are family-based. This creates a trade-off between ties with kin, which provide safety and support, and non-kin, which provide economic resources. With family-based cliques, however, this trade-off between ties with kin and non-kin is less pronounced.
8. *Social norms on family importance (ρ) only affect social utility.* If family is perceived as very important for social utility, as e.g. in the Mediterranean countries (Alesina and Giuliano, 2010), then it comes only at the cost of lower trust, cooperativeness, and economic performance. In such case, social utility is also inversely related to network centrality and bridging social capital.

7 Conclusion

The purpose of the current study has been to identify the key mechanisms allowing the social network structure to affect individuals' social trust, willingness to cooperate, economic performance and social utility, and to trace how these individual-level outcomes aggregate up to the society level. To this end, we have constructed a novel computational multi-agent model, extending [Watts and Strogatz \(1998\)](#) to incorporate a number of additional agent characteristics and accommodate a range of findings from the associated socio-economic literature. The model setup also draws from our empirical findings for the Polish society based on a unique, detailed survey dataset. Implications of the model, however, reach beyond the specificities of this particular society and have been tested at the cross-country level.

Among other results, we have found that: (i) societies that either are globally better connected, exhibit a lower frequency of local cliques, or have a smaller share of family-based cliques, record relatively better economic performance; (ii) social utility presents a \cap -shaped relationship with network density and a negative relationship with the frequency of family-based local cliques; (iii) if contacts with family are highly valued in the society, then there is a trade-off between aggregate social utility and economic performance, and then *small world* networks are socially optimal, otherwise they are outperformed by highly diversified, inclusive networks; (iv) in dense networks, social ties are individually less valuable; (v) social trust is a functional substitute to social networks: in trustful societies, social ties are individually less valuable, and vice versa; (vi) in dense networks and trustful societies, there is a trade-off between individuals' social utility and economic performance, and otherwise both outcomes are positively correlated in the cross section.

The current study can be extended in various directions. The first item on our research agenda is to build a dynamic version of the considered model in order to allow individuals to endogenously form and dissolve social ties. This would allow us to identify the social network structures which will be formed in the long-run equilibrium, depending on the deep characteristics of the social capital formation process. One could then also study the age profiles of the considered variables as well as the relationships between the formation process of social capital, trust and cooperation, and the ultimate outcomes such as aggregate social utility and economic performance. In relation to this challenge,

one could also exploit the dataset provided by [Growiec, Growiec, and Kamiński \(2017\)](#) in order to base the assumptions on patterns of social formation on available empirical evidence.

Another important extension of the current study would be to collect and study more detailed, internationally comparable data on social capital variables. Ideally, questions on such variables could be included in large survey datasets such as the ESS or the World Values Survey. However, even more modest extensions of our related empirical study to other countries could be helpful for verifying (or falsifying) the computational model presented here.

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A Additional Aggregate Evidence from ESS Data

To provide an additional empirical check of the validity of our results, we analyzed the data from the European Social Survey (ESS), covering representative samples of population in 28 countries in 6 bi-annual waves (2002–2012). This dataset does not contain sufficient information to identify the four considered dimensions of social capital, however, and hence we can only hint that the aggregative relationships obtained from the theoretical model remain in broad agreement with the available cross-country evidence but we cannot test its empirical validity directly.

The first step consists in checking whether higher social capital stocks at the country level indeed go together with higher social trust, social utility,⁴ incomes, and well-being (life satisfaction or happiness). To this end we have computed country–year averages of *frequency of social contacts* (the closest available proxy for social capital in ESS data) and other aforementioned variables. We confirm, at the 1% significance level, that all these correlations are positive and all but one are quantitatively strong and statistically significant (Table 5, Figures 4 and 5).

Table 5: Correlations among country-level aggregates, computed on the basis of ESS data

	contacts	trust	social util.	income	life satisf.	happy
contacts	1.0000					
trust	0.4795*	1.0000				
social util.	0.2095	0.5585*	1.0000			
income	0.4855*	0.8009*	0.5551*	1.0000		
life satisf.	0.4975*	0.7833*	0.7346*	0.8595*	1.0000	
happy	0.5502*	0.7952*	0.7021*	0.8611*	0.9675*	1.0000

Note: Correlations that are statistically significant at 1% level are marked by *.

We note that the average frequency of social contact is lowest in Central and Eastern European countries (Hungary, Poland, Lithuania) as well as Greece, and highest in the Nordic countries (Norway, Sweden, Denmark, Iceland) as well as Portugal and the Netherlands. The average level of social trust, in turn, is lowest in Central–Eastern and Southeastern European countries (Turkey, Bulgaria, Greece, Poland) as well as Portugal;

⁴Social utility is not directly measured in ESS data. It has been computed as residuals from regressing life satisfaction (*stflife*) on income deciles (*hinctnt*) within a given country and year. There is zero correlation between social utility and income deciles at the individual level within each country-year cell but not across cells.

and highest in Nordic countries (Norway, Sweden, Denmark, Finland, Iceland).

Figure 4: Correlations between the average frequency of social contact, average incomes, life satisfaction, social utility, and social trust





Figure 5: Correlations between the average level of social trust, average incomes, life satisfaction, social utility, as well as between average incomes and life satisfaction




B Evidence on Within-Country Individual-Level Correlations in ESS Data

This appendix takes advantage of the within-country variation present in the ESS dataset. We are interested in checking the micro–macro linkages, i.e., the degree to which individual-level incentives are affected by country-level averages. To this end we have computed, for each country and year, correlation coefficients between individuals’ social capital stocks and trust levels, as well as the outcomes: incomes, social utility, and life satisfaction.

We find (Figures 6–7) that in *countries with abundant social capital* (frequent social contacts), social ties are less correlated with incomes (-0.3960^{***}), life satisfaction (-0.5310^{***}), and social utility (-0.6340^{***}). They are also less tightly linked to social trust (-0.4135^{***}). We can interpret it as follows: in societies with dense networks, the individual value of having more contacts is smaller than in societies where social networks are sparse. Additionally, we also find that in dense networks, social trust is also less correlated with incomes (-0.2909^{***}). Finally, societies forming dense networks are also less materialistic, as life satisfaction is less dependent on incomes there (-0.3097^{***}).


In another set of empirical exercises (Figures 8–9) we also find that in *countries where societies are relatively trustful* (there is a high average level of social trust), the frequency of social contacts is less correlated with incomes (-0.5406^{***}), life satisfaction (-0.4339^{***}), and social utility (-0.4173^{***}). By the same token, in distrustful societies, individuals’ social ties are relatively more important for generating economic and social utility. In contrast, if the average level of social trust is high in a society, social trust becomes more strongly correlated with life satisfaction ($+0.2969^{***}$). Finally, more trustful societies are also less materialistic, as life satisfaction is less dependent on incomes there (-0.4540^{***}).

Figure 6: How does the average frequency of social contact in a country affect individual-level correlations?




Note: every dot is a correlation coefficient computed within a given country and year.

Figure 7: How does the average frequency of social contact in a country affect individual-level correlations?




Note: every dot is a correlation coefficient computed within a given country and year.

Figure 8: How does the average level of social trust in a country affect individual-level correlations?



Note: every dot is a correlation coefficient computed within a given country and year.

Figure 9: How does the average level of social trust in a country affect individual-level correlations?



Note: every dot is a correlation coefficient computed within a given country and year.

C Additional Simulation Results for the Trade-Off Between Social Utility and Economic Performance


The current appendix presents additional results on the relationship between individual-level economic performance and social utility. As mentioned in the main text, when the results are averaged over all considered model parameterizations, both outcomes are essentially uncorrelated. We shall investigate, however, how this relationship might be affected by changes in model parameters. All the values reported below are average correlations over all considered parameterizations of the model conditional on the assumed values of given parameters.

The strongest impact on the relationship between individual EU_i and SU_i is observed for ρ (the importance of kinship ties for social utility): Kendall's τ correlation is approximately equal to -0.49 . The higher the value of family ties in the society (higher ρ), the lower the correlation coefficient between social utility and economic performance. For a low ρ , both outcomes are positively correlated: there are both social and economic advantages of being better connected. For a high ρ , however, both outcomes are negatively correlated: agents derive their social utility primarily from strong family ties, so the ones who have primarily family-based networks, have to accept lower economic performance.

A strong impact is also observed for σ (Kendall's τ approximately 0.27). This means that if the process of tie formation in a given society is strongly dependent on the intrinsic value of an agent (high σ), the correlation between agents' economic performance and social utility is positive. In contrast, in societies where tie formation is relatively unrelated to agents' characteristics (low σ), correlation between economic performance and social utility becomes negative.

Lastly, an interesting result for the correlation between social utility and economic performance is obtained with the probability of occurrence of local cliques (p). It is shown in Figure 10. If family ties are relatively unimportant (low ρ) and network formation is not strongly directed by the intrinsic value of an agent (low σ) then p is relatively unimportant. In all other scenarios, a low p – meaning that there are relatively few people in the society with long-distance connections – implies that these people enjoy relatively higher levels of both social utility and economic performance; this leads to a

Figure 10: The relationship between p , ρ , σ and the correlation between individuals' social utility and economic performance



relatively higher correlation of EU_i and SU_i . Moreover, in the societies where family ties are relatively important ($\rho > 0.5$), if the network starts to be very inclusive (a low number of local cliques, high p) we observe that the correlation between economic performance and social utility starts to grow as well. The reason for such a situation is that in such societies the individuals who have a large number of contacts (high D_i) naturally have a high EU_i but also they have a relatively high SU_i as they are likely to have more connections with family members.